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I. INTRODUCTION
America has a problem with its prisons. The nation has an unequalled 
appetite for imprisoning its citizens,1 and despite being the wealthiest country 
in the world, its prison conditions are little better than those of many Third 
World countries.2 Inmates, as a class, attract few sympathizers beyond their 
immediate friends and families.  Politicians have long realized that imprisoning 
offenders for long periods is popular but spending tax dollars on the upkeep 
of inmates is less popular.  In general, the policy of States has been to spend 
as little as possible on inmate security and welfare.3  This parsimonious policy 
choice has frequently brought States into conflict with State and federal 
courts in both criminal and civil proceedings.
Until recently, the principal tool available for inmates to seek remedies 
for their neglect or mistreatment was the civil litigation mechanism 
provided by a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.4  Few inmates have access to the
resources necessary to finance civil litigation to improve their conditions.  
The attraction of the § 1983 action was that prevailing litigants were 
entitled to claim a discretionary award of reasonable attorney’s fees from 
5the court.   The philosophy underlying the interplay between § 1983 actions 
and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 has been likened 
to privatizing the function of a State’s attorney general to deter civil rights 
violations.6  State representatives resented the supervision and interference of
federal courts in what they saw as essentially a matter between them and 
1. See Highest to Lowest - Prison Population Rate, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, https://
www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison_population_rate?field_region_taxonomy_ 
tid=All [https://perma.cc/46G4-MHYN] (listing the United States of America as having 
the highest prison population rate among over 200 countries). 
2. See Matt Ford, The Everyday Brutality of America’s Prisons, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Apr. 5, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/153473/everyday-brutality-americas-prisons
[https://perma.cc/3R9N-8R3W].
3. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, Mass Incarceration, Convict Leasing, and the
Thirteenth Amendment: A Revisionist Account, N.Y.U. L. REV. 1465, 1547 (2019) (“[P]rivate 
prisons spend as little as possible on the care and rehabilitation of inmates in order to keep 
costs low and profits high.”); Courtney Harper Turkington, Comment, Louisiana’s Addiction 
to Mass Incarceration by the Numbers, 63 LOY. L. REV. 557, 571, 583–84 (2017) (noting 
that although Louisiana’s budget of $24.39 per prisoner at local jail facilities is in line with 
that in other southern states, those facilities spend as little of that on the inmates themselves 
as possible).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018); see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to
Constitutional Torts, 107 CAL. L. REV. 933, 946 (2019). 
5. See Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2018). 
6. See, e.g., David Shub, Note, Private Attorneys General, Prevailing Parties, and
Public Benefit: Attorney’s Fees Awards for Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 42 DUKE L.J. 706, 708– 
12 (1992). 
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their electorate.7  It was not long before the success of this tool saw States 
lobbying Congress to limit the ability of federal courts to supervise their 
actions.8  Consequently, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, which requires inmates to firstly exhaust 
administrative remedies before resorting to a § 1983 action.9  The result 
was a substantial reduction in the volume of successful § 1983 actions.10 
California is home to the largest death row in the nation,11 has a “three 
strikes” law,12 and a substantial population of inmates serving indeterminate
sentences.13  It is also one of the wealthiest States in the Union.14 
Nevertheless, it has an unenviable record of poor prison conditions and 
inadequate inmate care.15  In 2011 Justice Kennedy, himself a Californian,16 
speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court, observed in Brown v. Plata, “This 
case arises from serious constitutional violations in California’s prison 
system. The violations have persisted for years.  They remain uncorrected.”17 
He went on to explain:
7. Cf. Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds 
of a Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1864 (2003) (noting 
that some have argued that § 1983 intrudes on state sovereignty). 
8. See Meredith McCollum, Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Should
Prisoners Be Required to Exhaust Administrative Remedies When They Seek a Form of 
Relief Not Available Under Prison Procedures?, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 369, 369 n.2 (2001). 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2018) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined 
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 
available are exhausted.”). 
 10. Barbara Belbot, Report on the Prison Litigation Reform Act: What Have the Courts
Decided So Far?, 84 PRISON J. 290, 306 (2004).  For an example of an early overview of 
the impact of this legislation on § 1983 actions, see id. 
11. See California, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-
and-federal-info/state-by-state/California [https://perma.cc/MQW3-X6XD].
12. California’s Three Strikes Sentencing Law, CAL. CTS., https://www.courts.ca.gov/
20142.htm [https://perma.cc/86FP-FE49]. 
13. See Sentencing, Incarceration & Parole of Offenders, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS 
AND REHABILITATION, https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/victim-services/sentencing/ [https://perma.cc/
34EV-6XUB].
14. See Dan Blystone, Top 10 Richest U.S. States, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 29, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/101015/10-wealthiest-states-united-
states.asp [https://perma.cc/AB52-RXBR].
15. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 501–02 (2011). 
16. Anthony M. Kennedy, Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/justices/anthony_m_kennedy
[https://perma.cc/UDG2-E237].
17. Brown, 563 U.S. at 499. 
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Overcrowding has overtaken the limited resources of prison staff; imposed
demands well beyond the capacity of medical and mental health facilities; and
created unsanitary and unsafe conditions that make progress in the provision of
care difficult or impossible to achieve.  The overcrowding is the “primary cause
of the violation of a Federal right,” specifically the severe and unlawful
mistreatment of prisoners through grossly inadequate provision of medical and
mental health care.18 
There is a body of litigation dissecting the shortcomings of county jails 
and juvenile facilities in California, including inadequate access to physical
and mental health care in Riverside County,19 failing to provide minimally
adequate health care and to protect prisoners from injury and violence 
from other prisoners in Fresno County,20 and maintaining overcrowded
and understaffed jails, subjecting inmates to dangerous, inhumane, and 
degrading conditions in Sacramento County.21 
With the decline in the use of § 1983 actions after 1997,22 there were
other options open in California to provide a degree of accountability for 
penal institutions.  Firstly, California had its own partial equivalent of the 
federal § 1983 action—an action under California Civil Code section 
52.1.23  Unfortunately, the reach of section 52.1 is confined to interference
or attempted interference by “threats, intimidation, or coercion” with the 
plaintiff’s exercise or enjoyment of any State or federal constitutional or 
legal right and does not extend to living conditions.24 
Secondly, California is home to several campaigning organizations and 
university projects focused on prisoners’ rights. Prominent among these
is the nonprofit public interest law firm, the Prison Law Office, based in
Berkeley, California, whose stated mission is to provide free legal services 
to offenders to improve their conditions of confinement.25  However, the
resources of these organizations are limited and many adopt a strategic 
litigation approach using class actions to focus on particular statewide 
problems.26 
18. Id. at 502 (citation omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i) (2006)). 
19. See, e.g., Gray v. County of Riverside, No. ED13CV-00444, 2016 WL 6822308, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2016). 
20. See, e.g., Hall v. County of Fresno, No. 1:11–cv–02047–LJO–BAM, 2015 WL 
5916741, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2015). 
21. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief at 1,
Mays v. County of Sacramento, No. 2:18-cv-02081-TLN-KJN, 2019 WL 3804192 (E.D. 
Cal. July 31, 2018). 
22. See Belbot, supra note 10, at 306. 
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1 (West 2007). 
24. See id. § 52.1(b). 
25. See About Us, PRISON L. OFF., https://prisonlaw.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/
7Q3U-KLXY].
26. See, e.g., Litigation, PRISON L. OFF., https://prisonlaw.com/major-cases/ [https://
perma.cc/C2QM-5HGL]. 
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Thirdly, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
has an Office of the Ombudsman.27  Since 2007, the Ombudsman has 
acted as an intermediary to address complaints and resolve issues raised 
by juvenile offenders in confidence.28  Adult offenders can complain of
staff misconduct by raising an administrative appeal.29  These are reviewed
by the Office of the Inspector General, which publishes semiannual reports.30 
We will consider the efficacy of these mechanisms for oversight and change 
in a future paper. 
A final mechanism is that of a peculiarly Californian institution—scrutiny 
by a county’s grand jury. California is exceptional in that it endows its 
grand juries with civil as well as criminal functions.31  California Penal
27. See Office of the Ombudsman, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, 
https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ombuds/ [https://perma.cc/V4KE-PEHM].
28. See OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., SENATE BILL 
518 REPORT, at 3 (2016), https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ombuds/wp-content/uploads/sites/165/ 
2019/06/SB_518_Report_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2L9-KYKC]; Ombudsman Services, 
CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ombuds/ombuds/
djj-contact-information/ [https://perma.cc/UT8N-N96W].
29. PRISON LAW OFFICE, INVESTIGATIONS OF STAFF MISCONDUCT 1 (2016), https:// 
prisonlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Investigations-March-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JHX9-3K63].
30. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., MONITORING INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
AND THE EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS OF THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
AND REHABILITATION, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT JULY– DECEMBER 2018 (2019), https://www.
oig.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/OIG_Semi_Annual_Report_July-December_2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5XBT-BZ6W].
31.  Currently, the only other State to invest its grand juries with civil investigatory 
powers is Nevada. Stephanie A. Doria, Comment, Adding Bite to the Watchdog’s Bark: 
Reforming California’s Civil Grand Jury System, 28 PAC. L.J. 1115, 1125 (1999).  The 
scope of a Nevada grand jury’s civil investigatory authority is stated to be: 
1. Each grand jury that is not impaneled for a specific limited purpose shall 
inquire into: 
(a) The case of every person imprisoned in the jail of the county, on a 
 criminal charge, against whom an indictment has not been found or an  
 information or complaint filed. 
(b) The condition and management of any public prison located within
the county.
(c) The misconduct in office of public officers of every description within the
 county which may constitute a violation of a provision of chapter 197  
of NRS. 
2. A grand jury that is not impaneled for another specific limited purpose may 
inquire into any and all matters affecting the morals, health and general
welfare of the inhabitants of the county, or of any administrative division 
thereof, or of any township, incorporated city, irrigation district or town
therein. 
 613
OAKES_57-3_POST OAKES PAGES FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2020 11:28 AM    
 
 
  
  
  
   
   
    
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Code section 919(b) requires that “[t]he Grand Jury shall inquire into the
condition and management of the public prisons within the county.”32 
Civil grand juries (CGJs) are appointed by the presiding superior court 
judge from citizen volunteers and serve for a year.33  CGJs have total 
access to public records, take evidence on oath, and can issue subpoenas.34 
They make findings of fact and recommendations.35  State institutions and 
public officials are obliged to respond to their findings if asked to do so 
by the CGJ.36  CGJs issue annual reports, which are publicly available, as 
are responses to their findings and recommendations by institutions and 
officials.37  These duties and powers make CGJs potentially well suited to 
identifying problems in penal institutions and proposing solutions. This 
aspect of California’s grand juries has been little studied and there is 
scarce literature on the subject.  In this Article we describe the activities 
of CGJs in their exercise of their public prisons overview function and
evaluate their efficacy during the period 2007–2017. 
II. CIVIL GRAND JURIES AND SCRUTINY OF PENAL INSTITUTIONS
Considering its currently near unique situation among State institutions, 
it is perhaps surprising that California’s civil grand juries and their functions
have attracted little attention in law journals.38 Some description is required
of the grand jury’s composition, remit, and functioning to assist in 
understanding the powers and limitations of the grand jury as a watchdog 
overlooking the operations of custodial institutions within a county. 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 172.175 (2015). 
32. CAL. PENAL CODE § 919(b) (West 2008). 
33. Id. §§ 896(a), 901(a). 
34. Id. §§ 925a, 939.2. 
35. Id. § 933(a). 
36. Id. § 933(c). 
37. Id. § 933. 
38. There is sparse literature on the issue, which is comprised principally of two 
student comments, see Doria, supra note 31; John M. Feser, Jr., Note, The California Civil 
Grand Jury: from Watchdogs to Watched Dogs, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 748 (1999); an 
academic article, see Michael Vitiello & J. Clark Kelso, Reform of California’s Grand 
Jury System, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513 (2002); and a report, see MELISSA FOWLER-BRADLEY, 
INST. FOR COURT MGMT., SHOULD CIVIL INVESTIGATIONS BE PERFORMED BY THE GRAND 
JURY IN CALIFORNIA (2002).  There is also a definitive study on the utility of the grand jury’s 
civil functions.  See BRUCE T. OLSON, GRAND JURIES IN CALIFORNIA, A STUDY IN CITIZENSHIP 
(2000). 
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A. Selection, Eligibility for Service, Powers, and Functions 
The State of California comprises fifty-eight counties.39  Each county is
required to have one or more grand juries to inquire into public offenses 
committed or triable within the county.40  One grand jury in each county 
has the special responsibility to investigate or inquire into “matters of civil 
concern”41—the “watchdog” function.
The size of each grand jury depends upon the population of the county 
in which it is situated.  For counties with a population of 4,000,000 or 
more, the grand jury comprises twenty-three citizens.42  For counties with 
a population of 20,000 or less the number is eleven jurors, subject to the 
board of supervisors’ consent.43  In all other counties the number is nineteen 
jurors.44  There is an eligibility requirement to serve as a juror—a person 
is eligible for service if they are a U.S. citizen aged eighteen or older and 
a resident of the State and county (or city and county) for one year 
immediately before selection.45  A prospective grand juror is also required
to be “in possession of his natural faculties, of ordinary intelligence, of 
sound judgment, and of fair character.”46  A final requirement is that they 
must have “sufficient” knowledge of the English language.47 
The principal difference between grand jurors and petit jurors is that grand
jurors volunteer their services, while petit jurors are randomly summoned 
for service.48 Although difficult to generalize, grand jurors tend to be older
39. California Counties by Population, CAL. DEMOGRAPHICS, https://www.california- 
demographics.com/counties_by_population [https://perma.cc/M8CP-2RR4]. 
40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 888 (West 2008). 
41. Id.
 42. Id. § 888.2(a).
43. Id. § 888.2(b). 
44. Id. § 888.2(c).
45. Id. § 893(a)(1). 
46. Id. § 893(a)(2). 
47. Id. § 893(a)(3). 
48. Compare How Are Civil Grand Jurors Chosen?, SUPERIOR CT. CAL. COUNTY 
L.A., http://www.lacourt.org/division/jury/JR0078.aspx [https://perma.cc/D6E3-W45H]
(describing civil grand jury selection as occurring by judicial nomination and voluntary
application by community members), with STATE BAR OF CAL., WHAT SHOULD I KNOW 
ABOUT SERVING ON A JURY? 2 (2010), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/portals/0/documents/ 
publications/Jury_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6NR-P8DZ] (describing petit jury selection 
process as “random”). 
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and retired citizens because of the time commitment required.49  For example, 
Orange County’s grand jury web page advises prospective applicants: 
The complex, diverse responsibilities of grand jurors make it necessary to give a
serious commitment to the time requirements.  The Grand Jury term is one year, 
from July 1 through June 30.  The usual work week is four to five days.  Additionally, 
attendance at some evening and weekend meetings may be required.50 
Counties have a grand jury web page, which contains advice to prospective 
jurors as to how to apply.51  The supervising judge selects a panel from
prospective applicants to reflect geographical diversity and appropriate 
skills and experience.52  The final jury is chosen by lot from the panel.53 
The California Courts Civil Grand Jury web page, quoting Noah Weinstein
and William J. Shaw, describes its composition thus: [A] grand jury is a 
short-lived, representative, non-political body of citizens functioning without 
hope of personal aggrandizement.  It comes from the citizens at large and 
soon disappears into its anonymity without individual recognition or personal 
reward . . . .”54 
Grand jurors receive their expenses and a modest stipend for their work.55 
They work under the supervision of the presiding judge of the county’s 
superior court.56  Although they report their findings to the court, they are 
49. See, e.g., 2016–2017 L.A. CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT, 282–83 
(2017), http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/pdf/LOSANGELESCOUNTY2016-2017CIVILGRAND
JURYFINALREPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF8L-YQ3W] [hereinafter L.A., 2016–2017
REPORT].  By way of example, the Los Angeles County Civil Grand Jury reported civil 
grand jury age demographics in their county for the ten years covered in this Article as 
comprising 221 out of 230 grand jurors being aged over fifty-five years. The median age 
for grand jurors during that period lay between sixty-five and seventy-four.  Id.  Only two 
grand jurors were under the age of forty-five.  Id. at 283. 
50. Commitment/Compensation, GRAND JURY ORANGE CTY., http://www.ocgrand
jury.org/Committment.asp [https://perma.cc/WXD6-LQHL]. 
51. See, e.g., Civil Grand Jury, SUPERIOR CT. CAL., COUNTY SANTA CLARA, http:// 
www.scscourt.org/court_divisions/civil/cgj/grand_jury.shtml [https://perma.cc/Q9WB-JRY9]
[hereinafter Civil Grand Jury, SANTA CLARA]; Grand Jury, L.A. COUNTY GRAND JURY, 
http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/ [https://perma.cc/N895-7J7T]; What is the Grand Jury?, GRAND 
JURY ORANGE COUNTY, http://www.ocgrandjury.org/ [https://perma.cc/N3AR-ZGGH].
52. See Civil Grand Jury, SUPERIOR CT. CAL., COUNTY SAN JOAQUIN (2020), 
https://www.sjcourts.org/divisions/civil-grand-jury/#/ [https://perma.cc/3BPC-3XCY] (listing
desirable skills and experience for potential grand jurors); Civil Grand Jury, SANTA CLARA, 
supra note 51, http://www.scscourt.org/court_divisions/civil/cgj/grand_jury.shtml#selection
[https://perma.cc/5LQD-KFDK] (describing how potential grand jurors are selected from
a variety of geographic locations within the jurisdiction). 
53. See Civil Grand Jury, SANTA CLARA, supra note 51. 
54. Civil Grand Jury, CAL. CTS., https://www.courts.ca.gov/civilgrandjury.htm
[https://perma.cc/K3L7-7ZFT] (quoting Noah Weinstein & William J. Shaw, Grand Jury 
Reports—A Safeguard of Democracy, 1962 WASH. U. L. Q. 191, 191). 
55. See Commitment/Compensation, supra note 50. 
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 914(a)–(b) (West 2008). 
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not controlled or directed in their inquiries by the judge.57  When a civil 
grand jury is first impanelled and sworn, the court is required to charge it 
as to its duties and to give it such other information as thought proper.58 
To assist with the performance of their duties, civil grand juries additionally 
receive training “that addresses, at a minimum, report writing, interviews, 
and the scope of the grand jury’s responsibility and statutory authority.”59 
The court is also required to appoint a foreman.60 
The range of topics potentially open to grand jury investigation and
inquiry is wide but, for the purposes of this Article, we are concerned only 
with its powers in connection with “public prisons” within the county.
The basic investigatory remit pertaining to public prisons is stated in 
California Penal Code section 919, which imposes three separate duties 
on a CGJ.61  It has a discretion to inquire into every case of unindicted persons
imprisoned in county jails on a criminal charge.62  It has a duty to inquire 
into the “condition and management of the public prisons within the county.”63 
Finally, it has a wider duty to “inquire into the willful or corrupt misconduct
in office of public officers of every description within the county.”64  Clearly
this latter duty extends beyond prison officials but enables, in appropriate 
cases, the grand jury to investigate such misconduct by staff in prisons within 
the county.65  To assist CGJs in this task, the grand jury is entitled to free 
access, on reasonable notice, to public prisons and to examine public records 
without charge.66  Although the CGJ reports its findings to the supervising
judge, it may—with the consent of the supervising judge— 
make available to the public part or all of the evidentiary material, findings, and
other information relied upon by, or presented to, a grand jury for its final report 
in any civil grand jury investigation provided that the name of any person, or facts
that lead to the identity of any person who provided information to the grand jury,
shall not be released.67 
57. See Civil Grand Jury, supra note 54. 
58. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 914(a), 914.1 (West 2008). 
59. Id. § 914(b). 
60. Id. § 912. 
61. Id. § 919. 
62. Id. § 919(a). 
63. Id. § 919(b). 
64. Id. § 919(c). 
65. See Civil Grand Jury, supra note 54. 
66. CAL. PENAL CODE § 921 (West 2008). 
67. Id. § 929. 
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This is a significant power as supervising judges routinely authorize
publication of the CGJs’ final reports.  In turn these reports are picked up 
by local news media and are brought to public attention.68 
However, perhaps the greatest significance of CGJs’ reports is that they 
cannot be ignored by public officials.  California Penal Code section 933(c)
requires that any public agency the subject of a CGJ investigation, and
whose activities have been the subject of a finding and recommendation 
by the CGJ, must comment on these to the presiding judge of the superior 
court within ninety days of the CGJ’s final report.69  Elected county officers 
or agency heads for which the grand jury has responsibility must comment 
within sixty days.70 Although the only requirement is to comment, rather 
than to act, upon findings and recommendations, the comments are themselves 
frequently the subject of evaluations of their adequacy by CGJs in 
succeeding years.71 
B. Civil Grand Juries’ Supervision of Custodial Institutions
A common impression of the function of a grand jury is based on 
knowledge of criminal grand juries and their unenviable reputation as
being a tool of manipulative prosecutors who, it is said, could get them to
“indict a ham sandwich” if so inclined.72  While criminal grand juries
normally examine only cases brought before them by the district attorney, 
CGJs set their own investigatory agendas and decide for themselves what 
to investigate.73  It has been suggested by one California court official that 
the grand jury’s “investigative powers are so broad that there seems very 
little they cannot choose to examine, as long as it is within their county 
boundary.”74 
The freedom of CGJs to select their own targets for investigation gives
them broad powers to investigate wrongdoing within the penal system. 
68. See, e.g., Donna Littlejohn, L.A.’s Shuttered Jails Delay Response Times, Take 
Police Off the Streets, Grand Jury Declares, DAILY BREEZE (Sept. 7, 2019, 10:53 AM), 
https://www.dailybreeze.com/2019/09/06/l-a-s-shuttered-jails-delay-response-times-take-
police-off-the-streets-grand-jury-declares/ [https://perma.cc/V7KV-UTRD].
69. CAL. PENAL CODE § 933(c) (West 2008). 
70. Id.
 71. See SAN DIEGO CTY. GRAND JURY 2013/2014, SAY WHAT YOU’LL DO AND THEN 
DO WHAT YOU SAY 1–3 (2014), https://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/dam/sdc/grand
jury/reports/2013-2014/SayWhatYoullDoThenDoWhatYouSay.pdf [https://perma.cc/D799- 
JYPE] (describing why an independent body apart from the grand jury is needed to evaluate 
government’s responses to past jury recommendations). 
72. People v. Dukes, 592 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (“Indeed, in this
case, the prosecutor served the grand jury the proverbial ‘ham sandwich’ and told them, in 
effect, to take it or leave it.”). 
73. See Civil Grand Jury, supra note 54. 
74. FOWLER-BRADLEY, supra note 38, at 21. 
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Their discretionary power to inquire into the case of every unindicted
person held in a county jail on criminal charges is tantalisingly ill-defined. 
The Code does not clearly identify any precise mischief that the power is
designed to address but is broad enough to encompass a wide range of 
potential official misconduct or neglect in county jails affecting unindicted 
detainees. In practice, it is likely that CGJs may not only be interested in 
alleged denials of a speedy trial,75 but also the conduct of jail officials and
confinement conditions. The principal practical limitation on this function as 
a watchdog is that a CGJ is not obliged to investigate a complaint.76 
However, in the case of the public prisons within their county, the CGJ is 
required to inquire into their “condition and management.”77  It should be
noted that at present a small number of prisoners are detained outside the 
county in which they were indicted or sentenced and are thus beyond the 
reach of that grand jury’s inquiries.78  Similarly, a CGJ has no power to
inspect federal prisons located within their county, only prisons operated 
by the State of California or the county in which the jury is located.79 
Perhaps the greatest problem with CGJ inspections of penal institutions
is that there is no uniformity of approach to the task from county to county 
or even, within a single county, from one year to the next.80  Each CGJ
is largely sovereign and can choose to put as much or as little effort into 
its inspections as it thinks fit consistent with its statutory responsibilities.81 
In practice there has emerged a kind of custom in some counties whereby 
their inspection reports detail a consistent methodology and use a uniform
75. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”). 
76. See Civil Grand Jury, supra note 54. 
77. CAL. PENAL CODE § 919(b) (West 2008). 
78. Cf. Sheriff, ALPINE COUNTY, https://www.alpinecountyca.gov/index.aspx?NID=204
[https://perma.cc/DU7H-6BXV]. Some counties may place prisoners in jails in other
counties to avoid overcrowding their own jails.  See id.  A few may be so small that they 
have no county jail of their own—for example, Alpine County—which had a population 
of 1,120 in 2017—according to its Sheriff’s page, notes: “There are no jail facilities in Alpine 
County.  Jail services are contracted to El Dorado County and Calaveras County.”  Id. 
 79. See Civil Grand Jury, SANTA CLARA, supra note 51. 
80. See, e.g., Civil Grand Jury, supra note 54 (describing the independence that
each year’s CGJ possesses and pointing out variation in CGJs from county to county); see 
also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 924, 924.1, 924.4 (West 2008) (indicating that only the 
judge possesses authority to disclose grand jury information and jurors face criminal 
misdemeanors for disclosure). 
81. See Civil Grand Jury, supra note 54. 
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format for presentation of findings.82  However, a wide variance of approach
to the task within a single county can be seen, for example, in the number 
of inspections carried out in a particular fiscal year.  In a populous county, 
such as Los Angeles County, one CGJ carried out 138 inspections in the 
year 2015–2016 but another only fifty-six inspections in 2010–2011.83 
The task is potentially onerous in a county such as Los Angeles where at
least two jurors must be present at each inspection and the jury itself
comprises only twenty-three members.84  Inquiries into the public prisons
in the county is only one of the many potential areas for CGJ investigation, 
and it is unsurprising that some juries may devote more time to the task 
than others. 
All CGJs are required to receive training at the commencement of their
duties and many make use of a guide prepared by the California Board of
State and Community Corrections or the California Grand Jurors’
Association.85 Some reports replicated the model inspection report forms
82. For example, Alameda County’s Civil Grand Juries produced similar reports
from 2007–2012, both stylistically and methodologically.  See generally ALAMEDA CTY. 
CIVIL GRAND JURY, 2011–2012 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT 
(2012) http://grandjury.acgov.org/grandjury-assets/docs/2011-2012/final2011-2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NG84-6RMU] [hereinafter ALAMEDA, 2011–2012 REPORT]; ALAMEDA
CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, 2010–2011 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT 
(2011), http://grandjury.acgov.org/grandjury-assets/docs/2010-2011/final2010-2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FR3S-VP5H] [hereinafter ALAMEDA, 2010–2011 REPORT]; ALAMEDA
CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, 2009–2010 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT 
(2010), http://grandjury.acgov.org/grandjury-assets/docs/2009-2010/final2009-2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/37YB-92KZ] [hereinafter ALAMEDA, 2009–2010 REPORT]; ALAMEDA 
CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, 2008–2009 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT 
(2009), http://grandjury.acgov.org/grandjury-assets/docs/2008-2009/final2008-2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EF87-BACC] [hereinafter ALAMEDA, 2008–2009 REPORT]; ALAMEDA 
CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, 2007–2008 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT 
(2008), http://grandjury.acgov.org/grandjury-assets/docs/2007-2008/final2007-2008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DBK9-WNUJ] [hereinafter ALAMEDA, 2007–2008 REPORT].
83. Compare 2015–2016 L.A. CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 401 (2016),
http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/pdf/LOSANGELESCOUNTY2015-2016CIVILGRAND 
JURYFINALREPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/L32Q-SGAT] [hereinafter L.A., 2015–2016
REPORT] (inspecting every facility), with CIVIL GRAND JURY, CTY. OF L.A., FINAL REPORT 
2010–2011, at 333 (2011), http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/Final%20Grand%20Jury%20Report/
FINAL%20REPORT%202010-2011%20LOS%20ANGELES%20COUNTY%20CIVIL
%20GRAND%20JURY.pdf [https://perma.cc/J675-K4TM] [hereinafter L.A., 2010–2011
REPORT] (“selecting” certain facilities for inspection). 
84. See L.A., 2015–2016 REPORT, supra note 83, at 401. 
85. CAL. BD. OF STATE & CMTY. CORR., JAIL INSPECTION HANDBOOK FOR GRAND 
JURORS (2015), https://cgja.org/sites/default/files/bsccjailinspectionshandbook.doc [https://
perma.cc/V4AS-F5C2]; CAL. GRAND JURORS’ ASS’N, GRAND JURY RESOURCE MANUAL 
FOR CALIFORNIA COURTS: MODEL GUIDE FOR CIVIL GRAND JURORS (2005), http://gsmall.us/
GJ/ProceduresManual/ModelGrandJuryReferenceManual.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6AE-HK55]. 
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recommended in these manuals; however, others gave little explicit details 
of the checks carried out.86 
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF GRAND JURY INSPECTIONS
A. Methodology 
Our aim in this study was to gauge the effectiveness of civil grand jury 
inspections of the public prisons within their counties as one means of
detecting the uncorrected constitutional violations in the prison system 
referred to by Justice Kennedy in his opinion in Brown v. Plata.87  It was
clear that there would be substantial work in retrieving, reading, and 
analysing reports for all counties over many years—such a task would be 
more suitable for a doctoral thesis because retrieving and reading reports 
for all counties over a decade would involve perusing 580 final reports.  It 
seemed to us that rather than picking one or two years at random and 
analysing the grand jury final reports for all fifty-eight counties for those 
years, it would be better to perform a longitudinal study on a representative 
sample of counties. 
We chose to study fifteen counties: five with large populations—
Alameda, Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, and Santa Clara counties— 
five with medium-sized populations—Butte, Merced, San Luis Obispo, 
Tulare, and Yolo counties—and five with small populations—Calaveras, 
Glenn, Mendocino, Plumas, and Tuolumne counties. We decided that 
a decade would be a convenient study period as it was long enough 
to see what impact, if any, grand jury reports might have, but short enough 
that the legal regime and relevant standards would be substantially similar 
throughout.
Our end point would be the 2016–2017 fiscal year as being the last year
where we could ensure published reports were available for all counties 
and also the subsequent year’s grand jury’s review of the adequacy of any 
required responses to findings and recommendations made.  Accordingly, 
the period studied spanned final reports for the 2007–2008 fiscal year through 
the 2016–2017 fiscal year—some 150 reports in all. 
86. Compare ALAMEDA CTY. GRAND JURY, 2016–2017 ALAMEDA COUNTY GRAND 
JURY FINAL REPORT 100–14 (2017), http://grandjury.acgov.org/grandjury-assets/docs/2015-
2016/2016-2017-GJ-FinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/EH68-TFY2] [hereinafter ALAMEDA,
2016–2017 REPORT], with ALAMEDA, 2009–2010 REPORT, supra note 82, at 55–56. 
87.  Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 499 (2011). 
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Investigation of the effectiveness of civil grand juries required a metric
against which to evaluate.  For the purposes of this Article, we have used 
civil rights litigation during the study period as these suits implicate the 
very kind of constitutional violations that Justice Kennedy had in mind in 
Brown.88  Again, for purposes of practical convenience, we have extracted
cases from a database of civil rights litigation rather than trawling exhaustively 
through PACER for reports. 
We used the University of Michigan Law School’s Civil Rights
Litigation Clearinghouse website to identify California cases relating to 
jail conditions.89  Results were examined to identify to which facility each 
case related.  Those where the jail was in one of the fifteen counties selected 
for review and where the case was active between fiscal years 2007–2017 
were extracted for examination.  Cases that were either ongoing or resolved 
in favor of the plaintiff within that period were analyzed to identify the 
principal areas of complaint.  We rejected a few cases where the facts 
complained of were not those that a CGJ might reasonably have been 
expected to detect during an inspection.  The result was a body of twenty-
five cases whose causes of action arose in nine out of the fifteen counties 
90 studied.
The litigated complaints were then compared with CGJ findings
immediately prior—two years—to the occurrence of the cause of action to 
see whether the CGJs for those years had made any relevant findings and 
recommendations. The purpose of this was to evaluate the watchdog
functions of the CGJ.91  In cases of acute events, such as beating deaths, 
we also looked at the CGJ report for the first full fiscal year following the 
events to evaluate the “lessons learned” functions of the CGJ.92 
A point of interest is that two major penal changes occurred during the 
chosen study period.  One response by the State of California to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown was the passing of Assembly Bill 109
in April 2011.93  The Bill, later renamed the Public Safety Realignment Act 
of 2011, took effect on October 1, 2011.94  Prior to the passing of the Act, 
88. See id.
 89. See Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, U. MICH.L.SCH., https://www.clearing 
house.net [https://perma.cc/944A-BRA2]. 
90. The counties were Alameda, Butte, Los Angeles, Orange, Plumas, San Bernardino, 
San Luis Obispo, Santa Clara, and Tuolumne counties. 
91. See supra notes 38–42 and infra notes 134–38 and accompanying text. 
92. See infra notes 134–39 and accompanying text. 
93. Assemb. B. 109, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); see Shivanjali A. Sewak, 
Comment, “Everyone Gets Their First DV Free”: Proposition 57’s Neglect of Domestic 
Violence, 123 PENN. ST. L. REV. 277, 286–87 (2018). 
94. See Emilie A. Whitehurst, Note, Shaping California’s Prisons: How the Alternative 
Custody Program, Designed to Remedy the State’s Eighth Amendment Violations in the 
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convicted felons served their sentences in state prisons.95 The Act aimed
to implement the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate requiring it to reduce the 
prison population to 137% of design capacity by the end of 2013.96  Part
of the State’s chosen mechanism for prison population reduction was to 
reclassify certain nonserious, nonviolent felonies as N-3 felonies.97  From
October 1, 2011, offenders convicted of N-3 felonies and parole violators 
would henceforth serve their sentences in local jails rather than state 
prisons.98  Counties created Community Corrections Partnerships to manage
the implementation of this reform, and there were fears that previously 
satisfactory county jails might become overcrowded and thus lay counties 
open to civil suits by inmates for violating the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.”99 
A side effect of AB 109 was that county jails, which traditionally had
held prisoners serving sentences no longer than twelve months, began to 
hold prisoners convicted of N-3 felonies and sentenced to terms longer 
than twelve months.100  Assembly Bill 109 was passed in response to the 
Supreme Court’s mandate to reduce the population in state prisons.101 
However, counties had no time to prepare for the substantial numbers of 
inmates they became obliged to accommodate in their jails.102  In their  
annual reports for the fiscal year subsequent to the passing of AB 109, 
county civil grand juries reported upon its impact on county budgets and 
facilities. The concerns voiced included, inter alia: the additional expense 
of implementing AB 109 to the county,103 the size of the influx of cascaded 
Prison System, Encroaches on Equal Protection, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 303, 317 & 
n.111 (2012). 
95. See Danielle R. Jones, When the Fallout of a Criminal Conviction Goes Too Far:
Challenging Collateral Consequences, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 237, 265–66 (2015). 
96. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 541 (2011); Sewak, supra note 93, at 286–87.
 97. See Albert Camacho & Mark Harvis, Realignment of California’s Criminal Justice 
Policies, L.A. LAW., Apr. 2012, at 15, 15. 
98. See id.
 99. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Hon. Philip H. Pennypacker & Alyssa 
Thompson, Realignment: A View from the Trenches, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 991, 1002, 
1025, 1036 (2013); Whitehurst, supra note 94, at 318 n.119. 
100. See Whitehurst, supra note 94, at 316–18. 
101. See Brown, 563 U.S. at 541; Sewak, supra note 93, at 286–87. 
102. See Whitehurst, supra note 94, at 318 n.119.
 103. See GRAND JURY 2013–2014, CTY. OF BUTTE, FINAL REPORT 36 (2014), http:// 
www.buttecounty.net/Portals/1/GrandJury/13-14/2013-14-Grand-Jury-Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3BV7-HSYM] [hereinafter BUTTE, 2013–2014 REPORT] (noting that the cost to 
the county of maintaining an inmate was $92 a day but the State was only giving it $20 a 
day per inmate). 
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inmates,104 possible overcrowding,105 adequacy of existing institutional 
security,106 and the challenging nature of some of the new inmates.107  The
rationale for the subsequent adoption of Proposition 47 is not entirely clear.  
The proposal asked voters whether penalties for certain offenders convicted 
of nonserious, nonviolent crimes should be reduced from felonies to 
misdemeanors.108  The League of Women Voters of California Education
Fund’s Smart Voter website presented an impartial summary of the issues 
facing voters.109 It noted that proponents of the Proposition claimed it could 
save hundreds of millions of dollars every year and could fund schools, 
crime victims, mental health, and drug treatment.110  Opponents claimed,
inter alia, that adoption of the Proposition could release ten thousand felons 
from state prisons.111  On November 4, 2014, Proposition 47 was adopted 
by a majority of 59.6% voting for and 40.4% voting against it.112  The effect 
of this was to reclassify certain minor felonies as misdemeanors that carried 
potentially noncustodial sentences.113  This new sentencing discretion was
likely to lead to a reduction in the numbers incarcerated in local jails.114 
104. See 2013–2014 GLENN CTY. GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 10 (2014), https:// 
www.countyofglenn.net/sites/default/files/Grand_Jury/2013-2014GrandJuryReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V69L-R92R] (noting that when one facility was inspected, some twenty-
six of its 105 inmates were held under AB 109 regulations and that this increase in the 
inmate population of nearly one-third compounded an existing staffing situation). 
105. See 2013–2014 GRAND JURY, MENDOCINO CTY., THE IMPACT OF THE PUBLIC 
SAFETY REALIGNMENT ACT ON MENDOCINO COUNTY 4 (2014), https://www.mendocino
county.org/home/showdocument?id=3808 [https://perma.cc/N9PV-T854] (finding that 
realignment may cause overcrowding at the current county jail). 
106. See MERCED CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 2013–2014, at 3 (2014),
http://web2.co.merced.ca.us/pdfs/grandjury/reports/Grand_Jury_Report_2013-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8NYC-HH9X] [hereinafter MERCED, 2013–2014 REPORT] (noting that 
since implementation of AB 109, a facility originally built as a minimum security facility 
now housed medium to high risk inmates). 
107. GRAND JURY 2013–2014, CTY. OF ORANGE, ANNUAL INQUIRY ON JAILS AND 
JUVENILE DETENTION FACILITIES 8 (2014), http://www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/2013_2014_
GJreport/JailsReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/GRK3-TPGX] [hereinafter ORANGE, 2013–2014
JAIL REPORT] (noting, inter alia, that the incoming AB 109 cohort contained “more assaultive 
inmates, more Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) inmates, more mental issue inmates, 
more 2 and 3 strike offenders, [and] more drug incidents”). 
108. See Proposition 47, SMART VOTER (July 23, 2015, 2:59 PM), https://smart 
voter.org/2014/11/04/ca/state/prop/47/ [https://perma.cc/2KPK-SANW].
109. See id.
 110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2014, GENERAL ELECTION
93 (2014), https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2014-general/pdf/2014-complete-sov.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DLT4-W6GC].
113. See Christian L. Woods, Essay, Proposition 47: The Unintended Consequence, 
38 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 83, 87, 89–91 (2016). 
114. See id. 
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The combined effect of AB 109 and Proposition 47 was to shift convicted 
offenders from state prisons to county jails and from county jails to
noncustodial sentences leading to an overall reduction in the total number
of persons serving custodial sentences.115 
In the discussions that follow about county jail inspections, we give figures
for numbers of findings and recommendations made for each county. 
Some grand juries list neither findings nor recommendations but rather
give narrative reports of their inspections.  In these cases, we have followed
the practice of the majority of counties and made educated guesses at the 
likely numbers of findings and recommendations they would have made
if they had specified them in a list where items sui generis are brought 
together under a single heading rather than individually itemized headings. 
Finally, our research is based heavily upon the published reports of county 
grand juries.  For practical purposes these are best accessed using each
county’s grand jury’s website. In this Article, for purposes of citation brevity,
we have used Bluebook citations appropriate to the original reports filed 
with the county’s superior court and county archivists.  However, readers
who wish to examine these reports may search for them more conveniently 
on the appropriate county grand jury website from which PDF copies can
be retrieved. 
In the course of retrieving reports, we discovered problems with some 
counties including one site that was not contactable, one report link that
had an incorrect report attached, some sites where reports proved difficult
to retrieve because the court or county had mounted the files on servers
with slow response times and many attempts to retrieve documents timed 
out before they could be completed, and two sites where several files were
corrupted and could not be read.  In the latter case, we contacted site
administrators who willingly supplied copies of reports by email but, at
the date of writing, some had yet to replace corrupted files on their websites.
We comment later in our Discussion in Section V on the existence of this 
situation—the fact that our research first drew attention to this suggests
that the public does not frequently access these sites to retrieve reports. 
115. See Susan Turner, Moving California Corrections from an Offense- to Risk-Based 
System, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 97, 113–15 (2018). 
 625
OAKES_57-3_POST OAKES PAGES FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2020 11:28 AM    
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
    
   
   
 
      
   
  
   
   
   
   
     
  
  
 
  
 
 
B. Jail Conditions in Alameda County116 
Alameda County was one of five large population counties selected for
evaluation. During the fiscal years 2007–2017, the county’s CGJs made 
a total of fifty-one jail and detention facility inspections or visits according to 
their annual reports.117 It is fair to say that these CGJs generally found little 
to complain about because, during the same period, they made only seven 
findings, nine recommendations and three required response requests.118 
Our examination of jail condition litigation reports revealed four cases 
where we judged that a CGJ might reasonably have been expected to 
detect or make findings about at least one of the circumstances giving rise 
to the litigation. The four cases were M.H. v. County of Alameda,119 Legal 
Services for Prisoners with Children v. Ahern,120 Babu v. County of
Alameda,121 and Upshaw v. County of Alameda.122  In all four cases, one
116. The authors acknowledge with gratitude the exceptional assistance given by
Cassie Barner of the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office in retrieving grand jury reports 
when the county grand jury’s website was not working. 
117. See ALAMEDA,2016–2017REPORT, supra note 86, at 100–14 (detailing the inspections 
of three detention facilities); ALAMEDA CTY. GRAND JURY, 2015–2016 ALAMEDA COUNTY 
GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT 3 (2016), http://grandjury.acgov.org/grandjury-assets/docs/
2015-2016/2015-2016-GJ-FinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC8Q-ERZ7] [hereinafter
ALAMEDA, 2015–2016 REPORT] (four); ALAMEDA CTY. GRAND JURY, 2014–2015 ALAMEDA
COUNTY GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT 3 (2015), http://grandjury.acgov.org/grandjury-assets/
docs/2014-2015/final2014-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DCE-KTEA] [hereinafter ALAMEDA,
2014–2015 REPORT] (five); ALAMEDA CTY. GRAND JURY, 2013–2014 ALAMEDA COUNTY 
GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT 3 (2014), http://grandjury.acgov.org/grandjury-assets/docs/ 
2013-2014/final2013-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9J6-SULJ] [hereinafter ALAMEDA, 2013–
2014 REPORT] (five); ALAMEDA CTY. GRAND JURY, 2012–2013 ALAMEDA COUNTY GRAND 
JURY FINAL REPORT 79 (2013), http://grandjury.acgov.org/grandjury-assets/docs/2012-2013/
final2012-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4Z7-GSK2] [hereinafter ALAMEDA, 2012–2013 REPORT]
(four); ALAMEDA, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 82, at 31 (three); ALAMEDA, 2010–2011 
REPORT, supra note 82, at 59 (six); ALAMEDA, 2009–2010 REPORT, supra note 82, at 55 (nine); 
ALAMEDA, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 82, at 47 (six); ALAMEDA, 2007–2008 REPORT, 
supra note 82, at 56 (six). 
118. See ALAMEDA, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 82, at 32–33 (finding one detention 
facility in need of replacement); ALAMEDA, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 82, at 48 (one 
finding of understaffing at a jail facility); ALAMEDA, 2007–2008 REPORT, supra note 82, 
at 56–58 (2008) (finding one facility “filthy” after two inspections). 
119. M.H. v. County of Alameda, No. 3:11-cv-02868-JST, 2015 WL 894758 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 27, 2015). This date and those in the following three footnotes are those of initial 
filing of the complaint.  All complaints were retrieved using PACER and copies are available 
on the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse website. 
120. Legal Servs. for Prisoners with Children v. Ahern, No. RG12656266 (Alameda 
Sup. Ct. filed Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12563 [https://perma.
cc/V5QS-HFE2].
121. Babu v. County of Alameda, No. 5:18-cv-07677-NC (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 21, 
2018), https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16357 [https://perma.cc/S7AK-T6QU].
122.  Upshaw v. Alameda County, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1027 (2019). 
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or more plaintiffs was an inmate at the Santa Rita Jail,123 and in Babu, 
another plaintiff was an inmate at the Glenn E. Dyer Detention Facility.124 
The litigation covered a range of behaviors and conditions ranging from 
a fatal beating by guards,125 failure to accommodate disabled inmates,126 
insanitary and degrading conditions of confinement,127 to sleep deprivation 
of inmates.128  All these cases involved substantial allegations that resulted 
in awards or claims for damages or injunctive relief.129 In M.H., the plaintiff 
received $8.3 million in damages for a fatal beating.130 In Legal Services
for Prisoners with Children, Alameda County agreed to pay $1.1 million 
in attorneys’ fees and make major changes to the jail to dramatically 
improve access for people with disabilities, including significant physical 
modifications to provide wheelchair-accessible cells, showers, restrooms, 
dining facilities, recreation areas, visiting areas, entrances, and healthcare 
facilities.131  In the ongoing case of Babu, the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief
stopping the use of “safety cells” and giving prisoners with psychiatric 
disabilities access to adequate mental health care.132  In Upshaw, the plaintiffs 
seek damages and injunctive relief to prohibit the county from, inter alia,
using overhead light, loud noise, public address system announcements, 
123. See Upshaw, 377 F. Supp. 3d at 1030; Civil Complaint for Declaratory &
Injunctive Relief at 3, Babu, No. 18-cv-07677-NC, ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Complaint, 
Babu]; Complaint for Damages at 3, M.H., 2015 WL 894758 (No. 11-cv-02868-JST) 
[hereinafter Complaint, M.H.] (seeking damages on behalf of a minor relating to the alleged 
wrongful death of the minor’s parent who was a prisoner at the Santa Rita jail at the time 
of death); Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief at 1–2, Legal Servs. for Prisoners 
with Children, RG12656266 [hereinafter Complaint, Legal Servs.].
124. Complaint, Babu, supra note 123, at 3.
 125. Complaint, M.H., supra note 123, at 3.
 126. Complaint, Babu, supra note 123, at 2–3. 
127. Complaint, Legal Servs., supra note 123, at 1. 
128. Upshaw, 377 F. Supp. 3d at 1030. 
129. See id. at 1034; Complaint, Babu, supra note 123, at 1; Stipulation and Order
of Settlement at 2, M.H. v. County of Alameda, No. 3:11-cv-02868-JST, 2015 WL 894758 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Settlement, M.H.]; Settlement Agreement, Legal
Servs. for Prisoners with Children v. Ahern, No. RG12656266 (Alameda Sup. Ct. Mar. 
24, 2016) [hereinafter Settlement, Legal Servs.].
130. See Settlement, M.H., supra note 129, at 2. 
131. See Settlement, Legal Servs., supra note 129, at 6–14, 24.
 132. See Complaint, Babu, supra note 123, at 3.
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scheduled prisoner activities, and maintenance and cleaning work for at 
least a seven-hour period each night.133 
Two important purposes served by CGJs are their watchdog and lessons 
learned functions.134  Civil rights suits have expensive consequences for
counties whether in awards of damages and attorneys’ fees or in staff 
retraining costs.135  A well-functioning CGJ would detect early signs of
likely problems in the penal system and sound an alarm to alert the county 
and the sheriff’s department.136  That is its watchdog function.137  One might 
also hope that when something goes badly wrong, a well-functioning CGJ 
might analyse the events and make recommendations to lessen the chance 
of future repetition.138  This is its lessons learned function.
The civil rights cases above point to serious problems in the county’s 
Santa Rita Jail—a facility with a stated capacity of 3,812 inmates,139 and 
a campus area of 113 acres.140  The Alameda CGJ has nineteen members141 
and inspecting such a large and sprawling facility is potentially a daunting 
task even if the full jury divided the task between its members.  However,
133. See Complaint for Violation of Civil and Constitutional Rights at 24, Upshaw, 
377 F. Supp. 3d 1027 (filed Dec. 31, 2018) (No. 3:18-cv-07814-JCS) [hereinafter Complaint, 
Upshaw].
134. See Civil Grand Jury, SANTA CLARA, supra note 51 (describing the “watchdog” 
function).  In this Article we refer throughout to CGJs as also having a “lessons learned” 
function—a phrase that does not usually appear in CGJ published documentation.  There 
is little point in having a watchdog “bark” unless someone is listening.  Sandra Rowe and 
Sharon Sikes have observed in a project management context: “[W]e learn from project 
failures as well as project successes.  By not learning from project failures we are doomed 
to repeat similar situations.  By not maximizing on project successes, we miss opportunities 
to implement good processes and practices to successfully complete existing and future 
work.”  Sandra F. Rowe & Sharon Sikes, Lessons Learned: Taking It to the Next Level, 
PROJECT MGMT. INST. (2006), https://pmi.org/learning/library/lessons-learned-next-level-
communicating-7991 [https://perma.cc/F5FW-YW8H].  CGJ reports are replete with findings
and recommendations that praise the good and criticize the bad.  Properly, these encomiums 
and admonitions together constitute the “lessons learned.”  However, in this Article we 
use the phrase to refer to warnings given—or that should have been given—that could 
have been heeded.  For an example of its use by a CGJ in one report, see GRAND JURY 
2015–2016, CTY. OF ORANGE, SHERIFF’S TEMPORARY DETENTION/HOLDING CELL AREAS, 
PATROL AREAS AND SPECIAL SERVICES 17 (2016), http://www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/2015 
_2016_GJreport/2016-05-13_Website_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5GA-DE75] [hereinafter
ORANGE, 2015–2016 DETENTION REPORT]. 
 [https://perma.cc/X42S-GGSN]. 
135. See supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text. 
136.  See Doria, supra note 31, at 1116, 1127–32. 
137. See id. at 1116. 
138. See id. at 1130–32. 
139. ALAMEDA, 2016–2017 REPORT, supra note 86, at 100. 
140.  Santa Rita Jail, ALAMEDA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFF., https://www.alamedacounty 
sheriff.org/dc_srj.php
141. About Us, ALAMEDA COUNTY GRAND JURY, http://grandjury.acgov.org/index. 
page [https://perma.cc/XE3M-NGD5]; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 888.2(c) (West 2008). 
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despite this being the largest public prison in the county,142 Alameda CGJs
did not inspect the Santa Rita Jail every year during the study period.143 
On the whole, when it did inspect the facility, the CGJ took a predominantly 
benign view of the jail and its staff.144  On one occasion it reviewed a
recommendation by the Alameda County Public Health Department that 
the jail should hire a fulltime dietician—but concluded that the present 
part-time appointment was cost-effective and made no recommendation.145 
Otherwise, it concluded that the jail was run satisfactorily and made no
findings or recommendations that required a response.146 
It seems surprising that, once the jury was put on notice of the beating 
death of Martin Harrison at Santa Rita Jail on August 16, 2010, and the 
filing by his family of the subsequent 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on June 10, 
2011,147 no subsequent CGJs looked into the circumstances of his death 
and what lessons could be learned.148  The consequences for the county
were severe both financially and reputationally—the $8.3 million settlement 
was reputedly the largest wrongful death settlement in a civil rights case 
149 in state history.
Considering the number of civil rights cases brought against the county 
or sheriff regarding behavior and conditions at Santa Rita Jail during the 
period, it is not an exaggeration to say that the CGJs were perhaps incurious
about conditions in the largest jail in their county.  In the last year studied
where the CGJ inspected the jail, its report details no major areas of 
142. See Santa Rita Jail, supra note 140. 
143. For the years where Alameda CGJs did not inspect Santa Rita Jail, see
ALAMEDA, 2015–2016 REPORT, supra note 117, at 3; ALAMEDA, 2014–2015 REPORT, supra 
note 117, at 109; ALAMEDA, 2013–2014 REPORT, supra note 117, at 111; ALAMEDA, 2012– 
2013 REPORT, supra note 117, at 79; ALAMEDA, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 82, at 31; 
ALAMEDA, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 82, at 59; ALAMEDA, 2007–2008 REPORT, supra 
note 82, at 56. Additionally, the CGJ only toured the Santa Rita Jail in 2009–2010.  ALAMEDA, 
2009–2010 REPORT, supra note 82, at 55. 
 144. See, e.g., ALAMEDA, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 82, at 47. 
145. ALAMEDA, 2009–2010 REPORT, supra note 82, at 55–56. 
146. Id.
 147. See generally Complaint, M.H., supra note 123. 
148. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (listing 2011–2016 with no inspections
of Santa Rita Jail). The 2016–2017 CGJ was the first grand jury since the Martin Harrison 
incident that inspected Santa Rita Jail and included the inspection in its Final Report.  See 
ALAMEDA, 2016–2017 REPORT, supra note 86, at 100–06. 
149. See Carimah Townes, Largest Wrongful Death Settlement in California History 
for Inmate Who Didn’t Get Proper Treatment, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 11, 2015, 2:00 PM), 
https://thinkprogress.org/largest-wrongful-death-settlement-in-california-history-for-inmate-
who-didnt-get-proper-treatment-c66e720d5d92/ [https://perma.cc/H8KK-YVPE]. 
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concern.150  While the CGJ for fiscal year 2016–2017 would not have been
aware of the litigation in the 2018 cases of Babu and Upshaw, the 
circumstances that gave rise to those cases should have been evident during 
the period studied.151  The jury should have been aware of the circumstances
that gave rise to M.H. and Legal Services for Prisoners with Children as 
both cases had been settled by then.152  By its own account, it “inspected
the booking area, one housing unit, the Sandy Turner Education Center, 
and the Santa Rita Transition Center.”153  At the least one might have expected 
the jury to want to examine wheelchair accessibility in the areas referred 
to in the settlement of the Legal Services for Prisoners with Children case 
and report its findings.154 
Camp Wilmont Sweeney was the subject of extensive and trenchant 
criticism by some juries.  Various CGJs expressed concerns about the 
camp but perhaps the strongest were those of the 2010–2011 jury which 
declared itself “appalled at what we heard and saw during our November 
2010 visit.”155  The jury described finding, inter alia, overgrown weeds
throughout the facility, a library that appeared more like a ransacked storage 
room and smelling of mold and mildew, ceilings that were sagging with 
evidence of leakage, and even a dead mouse outside one door.156  The jury
noted that a 2008 report by criminal justice consultants Carter Goble Lee 
described the camp as being inappropriate for renovation and that it 
“present[ed] unusual liability to the community and the County.”157  In its
Conclusion, the CGJ recognized that budget constraints made replacement 
problematic but questioned why nothing had been done to remedy a 
substandard situation.158  Its recommendations 11-6 and 11-7 advised that
the probation department should immediately bring the camp into compliance 
with State Health and Safety codes and accelerate the process for replacing 
the camp.159 
150. See ALAMEDA, 2016–2017 REPORT, supra note 86, at 100–06. 
151. See Complaint, Babu, supra note 123, at 1. See generally Complaint, Upshaw, supra
note 133. 
152. See generally Settlement, M.H., supra note 129; Settlement, Legal Servs., supra
note 129. 
153. ALAMEDA, 2016–2017 REPORT, supra note 86, at 100. 
154.  See Settlement, Legal Servs., supra note 129, at 6–14. 
155.  ALAMEDA, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 82, at 41. 
156.  Id. 
 157. Id. at 42. 
158. Id. at 48. 
159. Id. at 50. 
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Subsequent CGJs further criticized the facility in reports for the years 
2011–2012160 and 2014–2015.161  Despite these warnings, the county has
been slow to replace the facility.  As at the date of writing in November 
2019, the Alameda County Probation Department’s website reports that a 
New Camp Sweeney Replacement Project seems to have gotten no further 
than that the Alameda County Board of Supervisors approved $54.8 million 
in service needs and related costs associated with the project on July 30, 
2018.162  However, a presentation to the probation department’s Public
Protection Subcommittee on February 14, 2019, projects construction will 
finish and occupancy will begin by June 2020,163 some twelve years on 
from the original Carter Goble Lee report.164 
Inspections of other facilities generally found little fault other than
relatively minor matters such as dirty unused cells at the Glenn E. Dyer 
Detention Facility,165 a water pressure problem in one cell at the Hayward 
Courthouse Jail,166 and unclear marking of storage of first aid kits at the 
Hayward Police Department Jail.167  Alameda County CGJs present a somewhat
variable picture of reliability in detecting and reporting problems within 
their public prisons.  Their vigilance in monitoring Camp Wilmont Sweeney 
is exemplary but they were less successful in detecting problems that led 
to other civil rights litigation. 
C. Jail Conditions in Butte County 
Butte County was one of five medium population counties selected for
evaluation. During the fiscal years 2007–2017, the county’s CGJs made
a total of twenty jail and detention facility inspections or visits according 
160. ALAMEDA, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 82, at 32–33 (noting improvements 
since the 2010–2011 Report but stating that the entire facility needed to be rebuilt). 
161. ALAMEDA, 2014–2015 REPORT, supra note 117, at 111–14 (noting that the facility 
remained “old and dilapidated” and was understaffed). 
162. See ALAMEDA CTY. PROB. DEP’T., STRATEGIC PLAN: VISION 2023, at 8 & n.5 
(2018), https://probation.acgov.org/probation-assets/files/Strategic_Plan_Vision.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2EPR-NHPR]. 
163. PUB. PROT. SUBCOMM., ALAMEDA CTY. PROB. DEP’T, CAMP WILMONT SWEENEY 
REPLACEMENT PROJECT 16 (2019), http://www.acgov.org/board/bos_calendar/documents/
DocsAgendaReg_2_14_19/public%20protection/Regular%20Calendar/Camp_Sweeney
_replacement_project_2_14_19.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LSN-SBBG].
164. See ALAMEDA, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 82, at 42. 
165. ALAMEDA, 2007–2008 REPORT, supra note 82, at 57–58. 
166. ALAMEDA, 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 117, at 80. 
167. ALAMEDA, 2015–2016 REPORT, supra note 117, at 107–08. 
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to their annual reports.168  CGJs made 102 jail findings, gave 67 
recommendations, and required 41 institutional responses.169  
168. See 2016–2017 BUTTE CTY. GRAND JURY, 2016–2017 BUTTE COUNTY GRAND 
JURY REPORT 25 (2017), https://www.buttecourt.ca.gov/GrandJury/reports/2016-2017% 
20Grand%20Jury%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H9A-DUTB] [hereinafter BUTTE,
2016–2017 REPORT] (two); BUTTE CTY. GRAND JURY 2015–2016, FINAL REPORT 9 (2016), 
https://www.buttecourt.ca.gov/GrandJury/reports/2015-2016%20Grand%20Jury%20
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9H3-JM4D] [hereinafter BUTTE, 2015–2016 REPORT] (two); 
BUTTE CTY. GRAND JURY 2014–2015, FINAL REPORT 3, 9 (2015), https://www.buttecourt.
ca.gov/GrandJury/reports/2014-2015%20Grand%20Jury%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JL5E-F5AZ] [hereinafter BUTTE, 2014–2015 REPORT] (two); BUTTE, 2013–2014 REPORT, 
supra note 103, at 33, 41 (two); BUTTE CTY. GRAND JURY 2012–2013, FINAL REPORT 39, 
47 (2013), https://www.buttecounty.net/Portals/1/GrandJury/2012_2013_Butte_County_ 
Grand_Jury_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/M95S-YBJ3] [hereinafter BUTTE, 2012–2013
REPORT] (two); BUTTE CTY. GRAND JURY, 2011–2012 BUTTE COUNTY GRAND JURY REPORT 37 
(2012), https://www.buttecounty.net/Portals/1/GrandJury/11-12/BCGJ_Final_Report_FY11-
12.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9VP-STMZ] [hereinafter BUTTE, 2011–2012 REPORT] (two); 
BUTTE CTY. GRAND JURY 2010–2011, FINAL REPORT 11, 19 (2011), https://www.butte 
county.net/Portals/1/GrandJury/10-11/BCGJ_Final_Report_FY10-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YSB5-FLQK] [hereinafter BUTTE, 2010–2011 REPORT] (two); BUTTE CTY. GRAND JURY 
2009–2010, FINAL REPORT, at iii (2010), https://www.buttecounty.net/Portals/1/Grand
Jury/09-10/09-10Table_of_Contents_and_Introduction.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDM2-JQYF]
(two); BUTTE CTY. GRAND JURY 2008–2009, FINAL REPORT 25, 31 (2009), https://www. 
buttecounty.net/Portals/1/GrandJury/08-09/Grand_Jury_Report_FY08-09-Pages_1-55.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S9VG-ACK7] [hereinafter BUTTE, 2008–2009 REPORT] (two); BUTTE 
CTY. GRAND JURY 2007–2008, FINAL REPORT 15 (2008), https://www.buttecounty.net/ 
Portals/1/GrandJury/07-08/0708GJ_Report_Part_1_Introduction_Table_of_Contents.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HC8G-RWZK] (two). 
169. BUTTE, 2016–2017 REPORT, supra note 168, at 138–39 (zero); BUTTE, 2015– 
2016 REPORT, supra note 168, at 9 (zero); BUTTE, 2014–2015 REPORT, supra note 168, at 
6–7, 12 (fourteen findings, four recommendations, four required responses); BUTTE, 2013– 
2014 REPORT, supra note 103, at 39–40, 48 (fourteen findings, four recommendations, four 
required responses); BUTTE, 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 168, at 44–45, 53–54 (nineteen 
findings, nineteen recommendations, four required responses); BUTTE, 2011–2012 REPORT, 
supra note 168, at 43–44 (twelve findings, seven recommendations, three required responses); 
BUTTE, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 168, at 17–18, 23–24 (eighteen findings, ten 
recommendations, six required responses); BUTTE CTY. GRAND JURY 2009–2010, FINAL 
REPORT: BUTTE COUNTY JAIL 177–78 (2010), https://www.buttecounty.net/Portals/1/
GrandJury/09-10/09-10Butte_County_Jail.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BQU-DAET] [hereinafter 
BUTTE, 2009–2010 JAIL REPORT] (seven findings, six recommendations, two required
responses); BUTTE CTY. GRAND JURY 2009–2010, FINAL REPORT: BUTTE COUNTY JUVENILE 
HALL 183–84 (2010), https://www.buttecounty.net/Portals/1/GrandJury/09-10/09-10Butte_
County_Juvenile_Hall.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8TJ-EALL] [hereinafter BUTTE, 2009–2010
JUVENILE HALL REPORT] (four findings, four recommendations, six required responses); 
BUTTE, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 168, at 28–29, 33–34 (seven findings, six 
recommendations, five required responses); BUTTE CTY. GRAND JURY 2007–2008, FINAL 
REPORT: BUTTE COUNTY JAIL 47–49 (2008), https://www.buttecounty.net/Portals/1/Grand
Jury/07-08/0708GJ_Report_Part_7_Butte_County_Jail.pdf [https://perma.cc/MKC7-CK54]
[hereinafter BUTTE, 2007–2008 JAIL REPORT] (five findings, five recommendations, six 
required responses); BUTTE CTY. GRAND JURY 2007–2008, FINAL REPORT: BUTTE COUNTY 
JUVENILE HALL 52 (2008), https://www.buttecounty.net/Portals/1/GrandJury/07-08/0708GJ 
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There was no new civil rights litigation against Butte County during the
study period.  However, the county is subject to a continuing consent
decree between the county and inmates of Butte County Jail whereby the 
county is obliged to provide inmates with “meaningful access to the 
courts.”170  The consent decree requires that the jail maintain a law library
that is staffed by Legal Research Assistants (LRAs), who are California 
State University, Chico students participating in the university’s paralegal 
program.171 
The CGJ reports frequently flag up the age of the Butte County Jail and 
the need for its replacement. In their 2007–2008 report, the jury found
that the Women’s Section in the “old Jail” did not provide a humane
environment.172  The 2009–2010 grand jury recommended that priority
should be given to funding the rebuilding of the women’s facility, which 
was stated to be overcrowded and outdated.173  The 2010–2011 jury also 
was not satisfied with the condition of the women’s facility and noted that 
the sheriff’s department cited “lack of funding” as the primary reason.174 
The 2013–2014 jury found that the jail was outdated and not suitable for
housing long-term prisoners175 and the 2014–2015 jury found that Butte 
County was in need of a new jail facility.176 
The juries addressed a number of less pressing concerns, mainly of a
prophylactic nature including understaffing in the central control room
and lack of clarity in the Jail Information Handbook,177 and the production
of a video in English and Spanish explaining rules, available programs, 
and what to expect in Butte County Jail as well as a planned Spanish version 
of the Jail Information Handbook.178  Other findings related to jail security 
and safety.179 
_Report%20_Part_8_Juvenile_Hall.pdf [https://perma.cc/75GJ-WDL6] (two findings, two 
recommendations, one required response). 
170. See BUTTE CTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COUNTY OF 
BUTTE AND CHICO RESEARCH FOUNDATION (2012), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/
public/JC-CA-0088-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/65A2-6G2Y].
171. Id. at 5. 
172. BUTTE, 2007–2008 JAIL REPORT, supra note 169, at 47. 
173. BUTTE, 2009–2010 JAIL REPORT, supra note 169, at 177. 
174. BUTTE, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 168, at 11. 
175. BUTTE, 2013–2014 REPORT, supra note 103, at 39. 
176. BUTTE, 2014–2015 REPORT, supra note 168, at 6.
 177. BUTTE, 2007–2008 JAIL REPORT, supra note 169, at 48. 
178. BUTTE, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 168, at 28. 
179. BUTTE, 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 168, at 45; BUTTE, 2011–2012 REPORT,
supra note 168, at 17; BUTTE, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 168, at 43. 
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Generally, the Butte County CGJ appears to have performed its public 
prison oversight role conscientiously.  It has used its bully pulpit position 
to urge the county’s board of supervisors to build a new facility and has 
drawn attention to actions that might ward off future problems.  As the
jurors remind readers in their reports, the Butte County Jail is the largest
correctional facility north of Sacramento,180 and, from our research, seems 
to have been successful in avoiding further significant civil rights litigation 
since 1984. 
D. Jail Conditions in Los Angeles County 
Los Angeles County is the most populous county in California and was 
one of five large population counties selected for evaluation.181  During
the fiscal years 2007–2017, the county’s CGJs made a total of 1,069 jail 
and detention facility inspections or visits according to their annual reports.182 
CGJs made 170 public prison findings, gave 222 recommendations, and
required 45 institutional responses.183 
180. See, e.g., BUTTE, 2014–2015 REPORT, supra note 168, at 4.
 181. See California Counties by Population, supra note 39. 
182. See L.A., 2016–2017 REPORT, supra note 49, at 301 (122); L.A., 2015–2016
REPORT, supra note 83, at 401 (138); L.A. CTY. 2014–2015 CIVIL GRAND JURY, FINAL 
REPORT 183 (2015), http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/pdf/2014-2015_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8PGW-EN3X] [hereinafter L.A., 2014–2015 REPORT] (121); 2013–2014 L.A. CTY. CIVIL
GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 337, 390–96 (2014), http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/pdf/2013-
2014_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SDS-L2R5] [hereinafter L.A., 2013–2014 REPORT]
(ninety-six); 2012–2013 CIVIL GRAND JURY, CTY. OF L.A., FINAL REPORT 185 (2013), 
http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/gjury12-13/Final%20Report%20%2012-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HEB8-JQHF] [hereinafter L.A., 2012–2013 REPORT] (ninety-four); 2011–2012 L.A. CTY.
CIVIL GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 413–48 (2012), http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/Final%20
Grand%20Jury%20Report/FINAL%20REPORT%202011-2012%20LOS%20ANGELES 
%20COUNTY%20CIVIL%20GRAND%20JURY.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX52-X6JG]
[hereinafter L.A., 2011–2012 REPORT] (ninety-six); L.A., 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 
83, at 333 (fifty-six); 2009–2010 L.A. CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 149–58
(2010), http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/pdf/2009-2010%20CIVIL%20GRAND%20JURY.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y98J-LX5K] [hereinafter L.A., 2009–2010 REPORT]; 2008–2009 CIVIL 
GRAND JURY, CTY. OF L.A., FINAL REPORT 405 (2009), http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/gjury 
08-09/MasterDocument2009-06-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/GFK2-CYG4] [hereinafter L.A.,
2008–2009 REPORT] (115); L.A. CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY 2007–2008, FINAL REPORT 319– 
26 (2008), http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/gjury07-08/2007-08FinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RX2B-S6GH] [hereinafter L.A., 2007–2008 REPORT] (127). 
183. See L.A., 2016–2017 REPORT, supra note 49, at 345–49 (twenty-eight findings,
twenty-eight recommendations, eleven required responses); L.A., 2015–2016 REPORT, 
supra note 83, at 425–35 (twenty-eight findings, twenty-eight recommendations, eleven 
required responses); L.A., 2014–2015 REPORT, supra note 183, at 208–11 (four findings, 
nine recommendations, four required responses); L.A., 2013–2014 REPORT, supra note 
182, at 339–43, 377–88, 395 (twenty-five findings, twenty-five recommendations, three 
required responses); L.A., 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 182, at 186–89, 190–92, 219– 
20 (zero findings, twenty-two recommendations, six required responses); L.A., 2011–2012 
634
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Our examination of jail condition litigation reports revealed nine cases 
where we judged that a CGJ might reasonably have been expected to
detect or make findings about at least one of the circumstances giving rise 
to the litigation.184  This was the largest number of cases for any county 
that we studied, but the result is unsurprising because Los Angeles County 
has many public prisons within its boundaries.185  The number of public 
prisons within the county varied during the period studied as some were 
closed and others opened—but the highest recorded figure was the 138 
inspected in the year 2015–2016.186 
The nine cases identified were Thomas v. County of Los Angeles,187 
Johnson v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department,188 Olivier v. Baca,189 
Amador v. Baca,190 Holguin v. County of Los Angeles,191 Rodriguez v. County 
of Los Angeles,192 Douglas v. Cooley,193 Rosas v. Baca,194 and United States
v. County of Los Angeles.195  Seven of these nine cases implicated events
REPORT, supra note 182, at 414–23 (five findings, twenty-one recommendations, six 
required responses); L.A., 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 83, at 333–35 (four findings, 
three recommendations, three required responses); L.A., 2009–2010 REPORT, supra note 
182, at 159–60 (zero findings, thirteen recommendations, zero required responses); L.A.,
2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 182, at 419–22 (eleven findings, eleven recommendations, 
zero required responses); L.A., 2007–2008 REPORT, supra note 182, at 316–18, 327–28
(twenty-two findings, nineteen recommendations, zero required responses). 
184. See infra notes 187–95 and accompanying text. 
185. See L.A., 2015–2016 REPORT, supra note 83, at 401–36.
 186. See id. at 401–21. The Report lists 152 public prisons but fourteen were closed 
or not in service during that fiscal year.  Id.  The figure includes both adult and juvenile 
facilities.  See id. 
187.  Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 703 Fed. Appx. 508 (9th Cir. 2017). 
188. Johnson v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 2:08-cv-03515-DDP-SH, 2011 WL 
1812746 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2011). 
189. Olivier v. Baca, 913 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2019).  Though the case was eventually
dismissed, id. at 857, CGJs prior to those decisions might have looked for evidence of the 
subject matter of the litigation. 
190.  Amador v. Baca, 299 F.R.D. 618 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
191. Holguin v. County of Los Angeles, No. 2:10-cv-08011-GW-PLA, 2011 WL 
7128640 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011). 
192.  Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2018). 
193. Douglas v. Cooley, No. BS138170 (L.A. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.
lacourt.org/casesummary/ui/casesummary.aspx?casetype=civil [https://perma.cc/N8LY-
SZ69].
194. Rosas v. Baca, No. 2:12-cv-00428-DDP-MRW, 2012 WL 2061694 (C.D. Cal. 
June 7, 2012).
195. United States v. County of Los Angeles, No. 2:15-cv-05903-FMO-JEM, 2016 
WL 2885855 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2016). 
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or conditions at the Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail.196  Because
actions were filed in these nine cases during the period studied, it might 
be expected that civil grand juries might have taken notice of these ongoing 
or recently commenced proceedings as a focus for their inquiries at that 
facility. The actions made a wide variety of allegations including inmates 
being forced to sleep on the jail’s floor,197 lack of adjustments for inmates
with disabilities,198 unprovoked beating while handcuffed,199 mass beatings 
of inmates,200 a policy of suppression of evidence in relation to such mass 
beatings,201 and inadequate mental health provision and care.202  Because
so many allegations related to a single facility, we focused our analysis on 
the CGJs’ inquiries into that facility throughout the ten-year period studied. 
Analysis of CGJ reports for the period 2007–2017 revealed no findings 
by juries relating to inmates at Central Men’s Jail being required to sleep
on jail floors because of lack of bed space,203 which was alleged in 
Thomas.204  Although the 2013–2014 report noted that cells were cramped, it
made no specific recommendations other than that the county board of 
supervisors approve the sheriff’s funding request for replacement of the 
jail.205  The reports for 2014–2015206 and 2015–2016207 similarly noted that 
the jail was overcrowded.208  Again, analysis of the reports revealed no 
196. Olivier v. Baca, 913 F.3d 852, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2019); Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 
784; Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 703 Fed. Appx. 508, 510 (9th Cir. 2017); Rosas, 
2012 WL 2061694, at *2 n.1; Complaint for Damages at 3, Holguin, 2011 WL 7128640 
(C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 25, 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-08011-GW-PLA) [hereinafter Complaint, 
Holguin]; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 11, Johnson v. L.A. Cty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 2:08-cv-03515-DDP-SH, 2011 WL 1812746 (C.D. Cal. filed May 29, 
2008) [hereinafter Complaint, Johnson]; Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint 
for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 20–22, Douglas, No. BS138170 [hereinafter
Complaint, Douglas].
197. Thomas, 703 Fed. Appx. at 510.
198. Complaint, Johnson, supra note 196, at 9. 
199. Complaint, Holguin, supra note 196, at 4.
 200. Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 785–87; see also Rosas, 2012 WL 2061694, at *3. 
201. Complaint, Douglas, supra note 196, at 20. 
202. United States v. County of Los Angeles, No. 2:15-cv-05903-FMO-JEM, 2016 
WL 2885855, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2016). 
203. See generally L.A., 2016–2017 REPORT, supra note 49; L.A., 2015–2016 REPORT,
supra note 83; L.A., 2014–2015 REPORT, supra note 182; L.A., 2013–2014 REPORT, supra 
note 182; L.A., 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 182; L.A., 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 
182; L.A., 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 83; L.A., 2009–2010 REPORT, supra note 182; 
L.A., 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 182; L.A., 2007–2008 REPORT, supra note 182. 
 204. See Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 703 Fed. Appx. 508, 510 (9th Cir. 2017). 
205. L.A., 2013–2014 REPORT, supra note 182, at 340–41. 
206. L.A., 2015–2016 REPORT, supra note 83, at 199. 
207. L.A., 2014–2015 REPORT, supra note 182, at 401. 
208. L.A., 2015–2016 REPORT, supra note 83, at 199; L.A., 2014–2015 REPORT, supra
note 182, at 401. 
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
investigations by CGJs during the period studied209 into the allegation in
Douglas that there was a policy of suppression of evidence of jail staff 
beating inmates.210 
In Johnson it was alleged that Men’s Central Jail lacked adjustments to 
accommodate the needs of disabled inmates.211  There was no special
investigation into this allegation during the period, but in its report for 
2011–2012, the grand jury noted that the jail needed more bars in its 
shower areas and recommended that it improve and increase the number 
of grab bars in the shower area.212 
The allegations of individual and mass beatings made in Holguin,213 
Rodriguez,214 and Rosas215 prompted specific investigation and comment 
in the CGJ’s 2013–2014 report.216  The jury noted that “[t]hrough newspaper 
and other media reports, the public is increasingly aware of alleged deputy 
assaults and other wrongdoings.”217  It observed during its tour of the jail
that cells were cramped and that such conditions could lead to disruptive 
behavior: 
The design flaws of this aged building prohibit full observation of the cells and
inmates by deputies.  The existing facility falls far below the standards of modern
jail design.  Excessive force by deputies is a problem at Men’s Central.  The use 
of force was confirmed by the Willis federal jury verdict.218 
It went on to recommend that the sheriff’s deputies and their commanding 
officers should be retrained on the proper use of force.219 
Finally, we can say that Los Angeles CGJs showed more general 
awareness in their reports of prisoners’ mental health problems.  These
were the subject of the Department of Justice’s action in United States v. 
209. See generally L.A., 2016–2017 REPORT, supra note 49; L.A., 2015–2016 REPORT,
supra note 83; L.A., 2014–2015 REPORT, supra note 182; L.A., 2013–2014 REPORT, supra 
note 182; L.A., 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 49; L.A., 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 
182. 
210. See Complaint, Douglas, supra note 196, at 20. 
211. Complaint, Johnson, supra note 196, at 9. 
212. L.A., 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 182, at 417, 420. 
213. Complaint, Holguin, supra note 196, at 4.
214.  Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 785–87 (9th Cir. 2018). 
215. Rosas v. Baca, No. 2:12-cv-00428-DDP-MRW, 2012 WL 2061694, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal. June 7, 2012). 
216. L.A., 2013–2014 REPORT, supra note 182, at 340. 
217. Id.
 218. Id. (citing Willis v. Vasquez, 648 Fed. Appx. 720 (9th Cir. 2016). 
219. Id. at 341. 
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County of Los Angeles (2015), a case brought under the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997.220  The issue is
mentioned and discussed in a number of reports.221  The county had been
put on notice of the problem as far back as 1996 when the Department of 
Justice wrote to the county notifying it of the Department’s intention to 
investigate whether the Los Angeles County Jail provided inadequate mental 
health services to inmates.222 
In an agreement between the U.S. Department of Justice and Los 
Angeles County, the county agreed that it would screen and evaluate inmates 
for mental illness at the Inmate Reception Center and, inter alia, provide 
adequate mental health treatment to all inmates that the jail determined to 
be mentally ill.223  The agreement had been in effect for five years before 
the period studied began and continues in force to the present day.224 In 
the Background section to the chapter Detention Facilities in the County 
of Los Angeles in its 2008–2009 Report, the CGJ describes its inspection 
methods and states: “The inspection form (Exhibit I) paid special attention 
to the medical and mental health services provided in the facilities.”225  Exhibit
I is the Detention Facilities Inspection Report form used by the CGJ for all 
its inspections.226  The front page has a rating panel for “Mental Health” 
as either compliant or noncompliant.227  The second page has a panel for
mental health with a topic reminder that “[h]ealth evaluations must be 
completed within 96 hours of intake.  Where and how do you obtain this 
information at intake? How do you identify individuals who are mentally 
disordered?”228 
220. United States v. County of Los Angeles, No. 2:15-cv-05903-FMO-JEM, 2016 
WL 2885855, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2016). 
221. See generally L.A., 2016–2017 REPORT, supra note 49, 301–50; L.A., 2015– 
2016 REPORT, supra note 83, at 401–36; L.A., 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 182, at 185– 
229. 
222. Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Joanne Sturges, L.A. Cty. Exec. (June 6, 1996), https://www.clearinghouse.net/ch Docs/ 
not_public/JC-CA-0002-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/FNV6-5ATK].
223. See Memorandum of Agreement Regarding Mental Health Services at the Los 
Angeles County Jail, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/between-united-states-
and-los-angeles-county-california [https://perma.cc/UQ3T-6FCN]. 
224. See Justice Department Concludes that Los Angeles County Jails System Has 
Made Progress, but Serious Deficiencies Continue, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 6, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-concludes-los-angeles-county-jails-
system-has-made-progress-serious [https://perma.cc/SS43-PWR3].
225. L.A., 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 182, at 406. 
226.  Id. at 423–24. 
227. Id. at 423. 
228. Id. at 424. 
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The 2009–2010 CGJ held a special investigation into “Inmate Healthcare,”
noting that “mental health issues affect about 10% of the inmate population.”229 
However, although revealing that the Twin Towers facility typically operated 
with about 20% physician understaffing,230 it made no specific findings 
about medical and mental health services at Men’s Central Jail.231  The 
2012–2013 CGJ took a closer interest in mental health services in the Men’s 
Central Jail, noting that “[t]he Sheriff’s Department operates the largest de 
facto mental health facility in the country” and that “most Type I facilities . . . 
sen[t] the[ir] most unstable detainees to Twin Towers or Men’s Central 
Jail.”232  In particular, it noted: “Training of Sheriff’s Department personnel
as well as other local law enforcement personnel in issues of mental health 
is critical, and based on the Grand Jury’s observations, insufficient.”233 
However, it made no mention of mental health services at Men’s Central
Jail in its recommendations234 or its inspection report.235 
The 2016–2017 CGJ made several general observations about mentally 
ill inmates in their report.  It considered that jailers were “attentive to the
health and mental condition of [the] detainees.”236  It further noted there 
had been a huge growth of inmates with mental health issues, which it attributed 
“to the closure of state hospitals or lack of community mental health 
facilities.”237  It reported that senior management at the sheriff’s department 
considered the department “not well equipped to act as a mental health 
agent.”238 
Successive CGJs were mindful of the agreement with the Department 
of Justice and have regularly reviewed and commented on mental health
provision in Men’s Central Jail.  It is clear, however, that jurors may have 
concluded that the rising tide of mental illness among detainees,239 the
difficulties and costs of providing appropriate medical assistance,240 the 
229. L.A., 2009–2010 REPORT, supra note 182, at 43–44. 
230.  Id. at 45. 
231.  See generally id. at 43–47. 
232.  L.A., 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 182, at 186. 
233.  Id. at 186–87. 
234.  See generally id. at 190–91. 
235.  Id. at 201. 
236.  L.A., 2016–2017 REPORT, supra note 49, at 303. 
237.  Id. at 305. 
238.  Id. 
239.  Id. 
240.  L.A., 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 182, at 187. 
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inappropriateness of a prison environment for providing mental healthcare,241 
and the poor fit between corrections skills and mental health nursing made 
the county’s task nearly unachievable.242 
Los Angeles County’s CGJs can claim some success as acting as the 
canary in the mine to monitor mental health care in its public prisons but 
rather less in other areas that have been the subject of civil rights litigation. 
E. Jail Conditions in Orange County
Orange County is one of five large population counties selected for
evaluation. During the fiscal years 2007–2017, the county’s CGJs made
a total of 144 jail and detention facility inspections or visits according to 
their annual reports.243  CGJs made 135 jail findings, gave 121 recommendations, 
and required 55 institutional responses.244 
241. L.A., 2016–2017 REPORT, supra note 49, at 305. 
242. See id.
 243. See ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY 2016–2017, THE GREAT ESCAPE – NEVER 
AGAIN? 4–11 (2017), http://www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/2016_2017_GJreport/2017-04-24_
The_Great_Escape.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG26-58B3] [hereinafter ORANGE, 2016–2017
ESCAPE REPORT] (five); ORANGE, 2015–2016 DETENTION REPORT, supra note 134, at 9 
(six); GRAND JURY 2015–2016, CTY. OF ORANGE, OUR BROTHER’S KEEPER: A LOOK AT THE 
CARE AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL INMATES IN ORANGE COUNTY JAILS 8 (2016), 
http://www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/2015_2016_GJreport/2016-06-09_Website_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P57B-R7KZ] [hereinafter ORANGE, 2015–2016 MENTALLY ILL INMATE 
REPORT] (three); GRAND JURY 2014–2015, CTY. OF ORANGE, ANNUAL INQUIRY ON JAILS 
AND JUVENILE DETENTION FACILITIES 16–18 (2015), http://www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/ 
2014_2015_GJreport/Jails_Website_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DUM-CH7E] [hereinafter 
ORANGE, 2014–2015 JAIL REPORT] (nine); GRAND JURY 2013–2014, CTY. OF ORANGE,
ANNUAL INQUIRY ON JAILS AND JUVENILE DETENTION FACILITIES 2 (2014), http://www.
ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/2013_2014_GJreport/JailsReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/37G4-KYMV]
[hereinafter ORANGE, 2013–2014 JAIL REPORT] (seven); 2012–2013 ORANGE CTY. GRAND 
JURY, FINAL REPORT 177–78, 207–08 (2013), http://www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/2012_2013_ 
reports/Grand%20Jury%20Final%20Report2012-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S3W-F5BP]
[hereinafter ORANGE, 2012–2013 REPORT] (nine); 2011–2012 ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, 
FINAL REPORT 138–39 (2012), http://www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/2011-2012GJFinalReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W23K-WL5M] [hereinafter ORANGE, 2011–2012 REPORT] (sixteen); 
2010–2011 ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 3–6 (2011), http://www.ocgrand 
jury.org/pdfs/2010-2011-Final-Report/2010-2011-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BKX-
MQLJ] [hereinafter ORANGE, 2010–2011 REPORT] (thirty-five); 2009–2010 ORANGE CTY.
GRAND JURY, DETENTION FACILITIES IN ORANGE COUNTY 2 (2010), http://www.ocgrand 
jury.org/pdfs/detention-facilities/detention-facilities-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HC53-
9J4R] [hereinafter ORANGE, 2009–2010 DETENTION REPORT] (thirty-five); 2008–2009 
ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, CONDITION OF ORANGE COUNTY JAILS 1 (2009), http://www.ocgrand 
jury.org/pdfs/countyjails/jails2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C7B-2ETV] [hereinafter ORANGE,
2008–2009 JAIL REPORT] (nine); 2007–2008 ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, THE STATE OF 
ORANGE COUNTY JAILS 2, 14 (2008), http://www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/countyjails/jails.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7C6Y-2922] [hereinafter ORANGE, 2007–2008 JAIL REPORT] (ten).
244. See ORANGE, 2016–2017ESCAPE REPORT, supra note 243, at 11–15 (seven findings,
five recommendations, two required responses); ORANGE, 2015–2016 DETENTION REPORT, 
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Our examination of jail condition litigation reports revealed two cases 
where we judged that a CGJ might reasonably have been expected to detect 
or make findings about at least one of the circumstances giving rise to the
litigation.  The number of public prisons within the county varied throughout
the period studied—but the highest recorded figures were the thirty-five
inspected in the years 2009–2010 and 2010–2011.245 
The two identified cases were Doe v. County of Orange,246 and Pierce 
v. County of Orange.247  The Doe case involved allegations of disrespectful 
treatment and denial of necessary medication at the Orange County Jail 
by an inmate suffering from gender identity disorder.248  The Pierce case
involved allegations regarding meals, overcrowded holding cells, outdoor 
exercise, dayroom access, religious services, and access for people with 
249 disabilities at the Orange County Jail.
The number of facilities reportedly visited or inspected in each fiscal 
year by CGJs varied from five in 2016–2017 to thirty-five in the years 
2009–2010 and 2010–2011.250  Despite fears of the impact of AB 109, CGJ
supra note 134, at 9 (eleven findings, eleven recommendations, five required responses);
ORANGE, 2015–2016 MENTALLY ILL INMATE REPORT, supra note 243, at 40–47 (twenty-
two findings, seventeen recommendations, five required responses); ORANGE, 2014–2015
JAIL REPORT, supra note 243, at 19–22 (nine findings, seven recommendations, two
required responses); ORANGE, 2013–2014 JAIL REPORT, supra note 243, at 2, 9–11, 22–26
(thirteen findings, eleven recommendations, eight required responses); ORANGE, 2012– 
2013 REPORT, supra note 243, at 196–98, 222–25 (fourteen findings, fourteen recommendations,
seven required responses); ORANGE, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 243, at 147–51, 163– 
65 (fifteen findings, seventeen recommendations, six required responses); ORANGE, 2010– 
2011 REPORT, supra note 243, at 7–9 (six findings, four recommendations, three required 
responses); ORANGE, 2009–2010 DETENTION REPORT, supra note 243, at 4–5 (four findings, 
three recommendations, six required responses); ORANGE, 2008–2009 JAIL REPORT, supra 
note 243, at 12–15 (twenty findings, fifteen recommendations, nine required responses); 
ORANGE, 2007–2008 JAIL REPORT, supra note 243, at 21–24 (fourteen findings, seventeen
recommendations, two required responses). 
245. See ORANGE, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 243, at 3–6; ORANGE, 2009–2010
DETENTION REPORT, supra note 243, at 2. 
246. Doe v. County of Orange, No. 06CC05833 (Orange Super. Ct. May 21, 2008), 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=10212 [https://perma.cc/A2H4-ZPLS]. 
247.  Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008). 
248. Complaint for Damages at 3–4, Doe, No. 06CC05833 (filed May 5, 2006)
[hereinafter Complaint, Doe].
249.  Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1195. 
250. See ORANGE, 2016–2017 ESCAPE REPORT, supra note 243, at 4; ORANGE, 2010– 
2011 REPORT, supra note 243, at 3–6; ORANGE, 2009–2010 DETENTION REPORT, supra note 
243, at 2. 
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reports throughout the study period make no findings of jail overcrowding.251 
Similarly, the issues complained of in the Doe and Pierce suits were not 
the subject of CGJ findings during the period.252 
The greatest continuing preoccupation of Orange County’s CGJs was 
jail security.253  The reasons for this are clear to see from the special report, 
The State of Orange County Jails, prepared by the 2007–2008 CGJ.254  The
report explains how the preceding eighteen months had been tumultuous 
for the county in that its sheriff-coroner had been indicted by a federal grand 
jury on seven counts of public corruption and had retired, while an inmate 
had been beaten to death by other inmates at the Theo Lacy Facility.255  It 
noted that a specially impaneled grand jury in 2007 had revealed 
that sheriff deputies at Theo Lacy routinely failed to perform their duty to guard
the “security of the jail and the safety of its inmates.”  Thirty minute floor checks
were seldom conducted.  Deputies were seen watching “television, full-length 
movies, playing video games, browsing the Internet, chatting online and sleeping
with the lights out.”  The harmful effect of this negligent behavior on the part of
certain jail deputies is exacerbated by the practice of handing control over to inmates
in blatant contravention of Penal Code section 4019.5 and OCSD Policy.256 
The beating death had occurred partly through inattention by guards and
partly because of blind spots in the jail not subject to video surveillance.257 
The CGJ made extensive recommendations, including installation of video
251. See generally ORANGE, 2016–2017 ESCAPE REPORT, supra note 243; ORANGE,
2015–2016 DETENTION REPORT, supra note 134; ORANGE, 2015–2016 MENTALLY ILL INMATE 
REPORT, supra note 243; ORANGE, 2014–2015 JAIL REPORT, supra note 243; ORANGE, 
2013–2014 JAIL REPORT, supra note 243; ORANGE, 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 243; 
ORANGE, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 243; ORANGE, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 
243; ORANGE, 2009–2010 DETENTION REPORT, supra note 243; ORANGE, 2008–2009 JAIL 
REPORT, supra note 243; ORANGE, 2007–2008 JAIL REPORT, supra note 243. 
252. See generally ORANGE, 2016–2017 ESCAPE REPORT, supra note 243; ORANGE,
2015–2016 DETENTION REPORT, supra note 134; ORANGE, 2015–2016 MENTALLY ILL INMATE 
REPORT, supra note 243; ORANGE, 2014–2015 JAIL REPORT, supra note 243; ORANGE, 
2013–2014 JAIL REPORT, supra note 243; ORANGE, 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 243; 
ORANGE, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 243; ORANGE, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 
243; ORANGE, 2009–2010 DETENTION REPORT, supra note 243; ORANGE, 2008–2009 JAIL 
REPORT, supra note 243; ORANGE, 2007–2008 JAIL REPORT, supra note 243. 
253. See, e.g., ORANGE, 2015–2016 DETENTION REPORT, supra note 134, at 25; ORANGE,
2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 243, at 196; ORANGE, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 243, 
at 149; ORANGE, 2008–2009 JAIL REPORT, supra note 243, at 12. 
254.  ORANGE, 2007–2008 JAIL REPORT, supra note 243. 
255.  Id. at 1, 5–6. 
256. Id. at 7. 
257. Id. at 6–7. 
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to cover blind spots.258  Successive CGJs commented adversely on video 
surveillance in 2012,259 2013,260 2014,261 and 2015.262 
One further area, inmate mental health, was the topic of an extensive
special report by the 2015–2016 CGJ.263 The jury made numerous findings 
and recommendations and required responses from officials and departments 
concerned.264  It is possible that the jury was mindful of class actions brought 
in adjoining Los Angeles County with potentially expensive consequences 
because it found much work to be done in Orange County. 
We concluded that overall the Orange County CGJs were performing 
their functions conscientiously.  Their insistent focus on improved video
surveillance suggested that lessons had been learned from the 2007–2008 
CGJ’s special report.265  Their special study of the mental health of inmates
also offered prophylactic advice that might, if taken, avoid future class 
actions in the county. 
F. Jail Conditions in Plumas County
Plumas County is one of five small population counties selected for
evaluation.  During the fiscal years 2007–2017, the county’s CGJs made a 
total of ten recorded jail and detention facility inspections or visits 
according to their annual reports.266  CGJs made fifty-one jail findings,
258. Id. at 21–24. 
259. ORANGE, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 243, at 148–49. 
260.  ORANGE, 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 243, at 195–97. 
261.  ORANGE, 2013–2014 JAIL REPORT, supra note 243, at 9–10. 
262.  ORANGE, 2014–2015 JAIL REPORT, supra note 243, at 19–20. 
263.  See ORANGE, 2015–2016 MENTALLY ILL INMATE REPORT, supra note 243. 
264.  Id. at 40–47. 
265. ORANGE, 2007–2008 JAIL REPORT, supra note 243, at 1–2, 5–7. 
266.  See PLUMAS CTY. GRAND JURY, 2016–2017 FINAL REPORT 2 (2017), https://plumas 
county.us/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/3170 [https://perma.cc/3MX8-3BSQ] [hereinafter
PLUMAS, 2016–2017 REPORT] (one); PLUMAS CTY. GRAND JURY, 2015–2016 FINAL REPORT, at
iii (2016), https://plumascounty.us/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/2832 [https://perma.cc/ 
9XLF-UUMB] [hereinafter PLUMAS, 2015–2016 REPORT] (one); 2014/2015 PLUMAS CTY.
GRAND JURY, 2014–2015 PLUMAS COUNTY FINAL GRAND JURY REPORT 47 (2015), https:// 
plumascounty.us/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/2548 [https://perma.cc/U4BA-MXZX] [hereinafter
PLUMAS, 2014–2015 REPORT] (one); 2013/2014 PLUMAS CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, 2013/ 
2014 PLUMAS COUNTY GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT 4 (2014), https://plumascounty.us/
ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/2123 [https://perma.cc/UH5J-Q6B8] [hereinafter PLUMAS,
2013–2014 REPORT] (one); 2012/2013 PLUMAS CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, 2012/2013 
PLUMAS COUNTY GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT 24 (2013), https://plumascounty.us/Archive 
Center/ViewFile/Item/1790 [https://perma.cc/DS6Q-BVZ7] [hereinafter PLUMAS, 2012– 
2013 REPORT] (one); PLUMAS CTY. GRAND JURY, PLUMAS COUNTY JAIL REPORT 2011/2012, 
 643
OAKES_57-3_POST OAKES PAGES FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2020 11:28 AM    
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
    
   
      
  
   
    
  
       
   
    
    
    
  
 
  
gave forty-five recommendations, and required eleven institutional 
responses.267 
Our examination of jail condition litigation reports revealed a single
case where we judged that a CGJ might reasonably have been expected to 
detect or make findings about at least one of the circumstances giving rise 
to the litigation.  There is but a single public prison within the county and 
this was inspected most years.268 
The case, Pederson v. County of Plumas,269 is a class action commenced 
as far back as 1989.  The county entered into a consent decree in 1992 
whereby it was required, inter alia, to maintain all housing units at the jail 
at or below their rated capacities, with an overall capacity of thirty-seven, 
to provide appropriate medical services, and to provide access to a law 
library.270  In 2013 there was an agreed amendment to the consent decree
at 1 (2012), https://plumascounty.us/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/1441 [https://perma.cc/778Q- 
8FLL] [hereinafter PLUMAS, 2011–2012 REPORT] (one); 2010–2011 PLUMAS CTY. GRAND 
JURY, 2010–2011 PLUMAS COUNTY GRAND JURY REPORT 3 (2011), https://plumascounty.us/
ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/1452 [https://perma.cc/9QQQ-P62W] [hereinafter PLUMAS,
2010–2011 REPORT] (one); 2009–2010 PLUMAS CTY. GRAND JURY, 2009–2010 PLUMAS 
COUNTY GRAND JURY REPORT 54 (2010), https://plumascounty.us/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/
Item/238 [https://perma.cc/J95T-ZHL9] [hereinafter PLUMAS, 2009–2010 REPORT] (one); 
2008–2009 PLUMAS CTY. GRAND JURY, 2008–2009 PLUMAS COUNTY GRAND JURY REPORT 
7 (2009), https://plumascounty.us/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/67 [https://perma.cc/ 
BT52-UHV3] [hereinafter PLUMAS, 2008–2009 REPORT] (one); PLUMAS CTY. GRAND JURY
2007–2008, FINAL REPORT 2 (2008), https://plumascounty.us/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/ 
Item/68 [https://perma.cc/T2GH-9K3B] [hereinafter PLUMAS, 2007–2008 REPORT] (one). 
267. See PLUMAS,2016–2017REPORT,supra note 266, at 2 (no findings, recommendations, 
or required responses); PLUMAS, 2015–2016 REPORT, supra note 266, at iii (no findings, 
recommendations, or required responses); PLUMAS, 2014–2015 REPORT, supra note 266, 
at 52–53 (four findings, six recommendations, two required responses); PLUMAS, 2013– 
2014 REPORT, supra note 266, at 22–23 (six findings, six recommendations, two required 
responses); PLUMAS, 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 266, at 26–27 (six findings, six 
recommendations, two required responses); PLUMAS, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 266, 
at 2–6 (seventeen findings, eleven recommendations, two required responses); PLUMAS, 
2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 266, at 7–8 (one finding, four recommendations, no required 
responses); PLUMAS, 2009–2010 REPORT, supra note 266, at 54–56 (thirteen findings, six 
recommendations, one required response); PLUMAS, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 266, 
at 14–16 (two findings, four recommendations, two required responses); PLUMAS, 2007– 
2008 REPORT, supra note 266, at 28–30 (two findings, two recommendations, no required 
responses).
268. Jail, PLUMAS COUNTY CAL. (2020), https://www.plumascounty.us/2170/Jail 
[https://perma.cc/MX3M-BAUT] (listing Plumas County Correctional Facility as the only 
jail). 
269. Pederson v. County of Plumas, No. 2:89-cv-01659-KJN (E.D. Cal. filed Dec. 
4, 1989), https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12199 [https://perma.cc/76V4-YDBB].
270. See Consent Decree at 5–8, Pederson, No. 2:89-cv-01659-KJN (Feb. 10, 1992). 
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specifying new capacity and staffing requirements.271  Compliance disputes 
continue to the date of writing.272 
The World Population Review states the population of Plumas County 
in 2017 as 18,740 according to U.S. Census data.273  The county necessarily
has a modest tax base and the costs of maintaining and staffing its county 
jail represents a higher per capita expense to taxpayers than in more populous 
counties.274  However, just as the costs of running the jail are higher, so
too would be the burden of paying legal costs and damages if, for example, 
a wrongful death suit resulted in an award of damages like the $8.3 million 
settlement in Alameda County.275 While the per capita cost of the settlement 
to the citizens of Alameda County was $5, a corresponding award in Plumas 
County would cost approximately $443.276 Even if indemnity insurance
271. See Joint Stipulation to Amendment of Consent Decree at 1–2, Pederson, No.
2:89-cv-01659-KJN (Apr. 1, 2013). 
272. Pederson v. County of Plumas, CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.clearinghouse.net/
detail.php?id=12199 [https://perma.cc/E6KY-DATY] (“The joint status report was submitted 
on February 15, 2019.  At the February 22, 2019 status conference, the court ordered that
‘By noon on 4/26/2019, the County is to provide a detailed report to the Court and plaintiff’s 
counsel, regarding its compliance with outstanding issues in this litigation as well as steps 
toward IMQ or NCCHC accreditation.’”).
273. Plumas County, California Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REV. (Aug.
28, 2019), http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-counties/ca/plumas-county-population/
[https://perma.cc/NNG7-BV23].
274. Compare Victoria Metcalf, Sheriff Addresses Increased Jail Population, PLUMAS 
NEWS (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.plumasnews.com/sheriff-addresses-increased-jail-
population/ [https://perma.cc/BNH9-ZF36] (noting that the Plumas County jail budget for 
2017–2018 was “just under $3 million”), with BD. OF SUPERVISORS, LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
2016-17 FINAL BUDGET 290 (2016), http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/lac/1037219_Final 
BudgetBook.pdf [https://perma.cc/GUU6-M4CT] (adopting a budget for 2016–2017 for
the entire Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department of $207 million with a net cost to the 
county of $99 million).  The per capita jail expense in Plumas County is, thus, roughly
$160. See Metcalf, supra; supra note 273 and accompanying text.  The population of Los 
Angeles County is about 10 million people.  See QuickFacts: Los Angeles County, California;
California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/losangeles 
countycalifornia,CA/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/SX99-C5AR]. Accordingly, the entire
Los Angeles County sheriff’s budget costs slightly more than $20 per resident.  See BD. 
OF SUPERVISORS, LOS ANGELES COUNTY, supra, at 290; Quickfacts, supra. 
275. See Townes, supra note 149. 
276. See Alameda County, California Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REV. 
(Aug. 28, 2019), https://worldpopulationreview.com/us-counties/ca/alameda-county-population/
[https://perma.cc/NNG7-BV23] (noting the population in Alameda County is roughly
1,635,000); Plumas County, California Population 2020, supra note 273 (noting the Plumas 
County population is 18,740).  $8.3 million divided by Alameda County’s 2015 population 
of roughly 1,635,000 is about $5, while that amount divided by Plumas County’s 2017 
population of roughly 18,740 is almost $443. 
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is taken out to cover such events, the per capita costs of the indemnity
premiums may be higher.  The cost of defending class action lawsuits,
such as Pederson, is also a greater burden on low population counties. 
The Plumas County CGJs have been mindful of these factors. Their
reports have regularly complained of understaffing,277 and the age and 
disrepair of the jail.278  As the 2012–2013 report noted: “It is painfully obvious 
that Plumas County needs a new jail.”279 The county is not scheduled to 
have a new jail ready for occupation until late 2020 or early 2021.280  The 
county’s grand jury web pages do not carry details of the responses from 
the sheriff’s department or the board of supervisors,281 so it is difficult to
say what role the CGJs’ persistent complaints and advice may have played 
in the eventual replacement decision.  However, because dilapidation and
understaffing are significant factors in producing conditions likely to lead 
to civil litigation,282 the civil grand jury cannot be faulted for failing to
draw attention to these conditions. 
G. Jail Conditions in San Bernardino County
San Bernardino County is one of five large population counties selected
for evaluation.  During the fiscal years 2007–2017, the county’s CGJs made 
a total of fifty-three recorded jail and detention facility inspections or visits 
according to their annual reports.283  CGJs made thirty-three jail findings, 
277. See, e.g., PLUMAS, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 266, at 3; PLUMAS, 2008– 
2009 REPORT, supra note 266, at 15; PLUMAS, 2007–2008 REPORT, supra note 266, at 28. 
278. See, e.g., PLUMAS, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 266, at 2, 4 (cataloguing the 
age of the jail and its general disrepair).  The poor condition of the jail featured regularly 
in the jury’s reports.  See, e.g., PLUMAS, 2007–2008 REPORT, supra note 266, at 30 (“The jail 
facility of Plumas County is old, outmoded, and unsafe for both inmates and jail staff.”); 
PLUMAS, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 266, at 14 (“The building has outdated plumbing, 
wiring, and utilities requiring constant and costly maintenance.”); PLUMAS, 2012–2013 
REPORT, supra note 266, at 26 (stating that “many inadequacies were found to exist in this 
antiquated facility” and listing six specific findings of inadequacy). 
279. PLUMAS, 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 266, at 27. 
280. See Steve Wathen, County Signs with CGA for New Jail, PLUMAS NEWS (Aug.
4, 2017), https://www.plumasnews.com/county-signs-cga-new-jail/ [https://perma.cc/
B2NQ-3RQH].
281. See Grand Jury, PLUMAS COUNTY CAL., https://www.plumascounty.us/216/
Grand-Jury [https://perma.cc/UE77-PAYK]. 
282. See Consent Decree, supra note 270, at 5, 8.
 283. See  SAN BERNARDINO CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY 2016–2017, FINAL REPORT 45
(2017), https://wp.sbcounty.gov/grandjury/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2017/10/2016-
2017CivilGrandJuryReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/EYZ5-AL8X] [hereinafter SAN BERNARDINO,
2016–2017 REPORT] (five); SAN BERNARDINO CTY. GRAND JURY 2014–2015, FINAL REPORT 29 
(2015), https://wp.sbcounty.gov/grandjury/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2017/10/2014-15-
Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F2Q-JT6S] [hereinafter SAN BERNARDINO, 2014– 
2015 REPORT] (six); SAN BERNARDINO CTY. GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 2013–2014, at 11 
(2014), https://wp.sbcounty.gov/grandjury/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2017/10/2013-
646
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gave thirty-three recommendations, and required no institutional
responses.284 
Our examination of jail condition litigation reports for cases whose 
cause of action arose or was ongoing within the same period revealed four 
cases whose cause of action arose or was ongoing within the same period 
where we judged that a CGJ might reasonably have been expected to detect 
or make findings about at least one of the circumstances giving rise to the
litigation.  The number of public prisons within the county varied throughout
the period studied—but the highest recorded figures were the eleven 
inspected in the year 2008–2009.285 
14-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RS23-B5MW] [hereinafter SAN BERNARDINO, 2013–
2014 REPORT] (five); SAN BERNARDINO CTY. GRAND JURY, 2012–2013 FINAL REPORT 68 
(2013), https://wp.sbcounty.gov/grandjury/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2017/10/Grand_ 
Jury_Final_Report_002.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK2F-KDXS] [hereinafter SAN BERNARDINO,
2012–2013 REPORT] (six); 2011–2012 SAN BERNARDINO CTY. GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 
31 (2012), https://wp.sbcounty.gov/grandjury/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2017/10/grand 
_jury_final_report_001.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG2U-Q2ZD] [hereinafter SAN BERNARDINO,
2011–2012 REPORT] (four); 2010–2011 SAN BERNARDINO CTY. GRAND JURY, FINAL 
REPORT 44 (2011), https://wp.sbcounty.gov/grandjury/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2017/
10/grand_jury_final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ3L-LNH2] [hereinafter SAN BERNARDINO,
2010–2011 REPORT] (four); GRAND JURY, CTY. OF SAN BERNARDINO, 2009–2010 SAN 
BERNARDINO COUNTY GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT 25 (2010), https://wp.sbcounty.gov/ 
grandjury/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2019/10/2009-10-Grand-Jury-Final-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E3QF-FKQK] [hereinafter S B , 2009–2010 R ] (ten); 
SAN BERNARDINO CTY. GRAND JURY 2008–2009, FINAL REPORT, at ii (2009), https:// 
wp.sbcounty.gov/grandjury/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2017/10/20090701_gj_final_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FKY6-S4ZH] [hereinafter SAN BERNARDINO, 2008–2009 REPORT]  (ten);
GRAND JURY, SAN BERNARDINO CTY., GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT 2007–2008, at ii (2008), 
https://wp.sbcounty.gov/grandjury/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2017/10/20080630_ 
grand_jury_final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE66-Z6DH] [hereinafter SAN BERNARDINO,
2007–2008 REPORT] (three).  See generally SAN BERNARDINO CTY. GRAND JURY, FINAL 
REPORT 2015–2016(2016),https://wp.sbcounty.gov/grandjury/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2017/
10/2015-16-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9ZT-KVTE] [hereinafter SAN BERNARDINO,
2015–2016 REPORT] (no jail inspections recorded). 
284. See  SAN BERNARDINO, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 283, at 41–51 (thirty-
three findings, thirty recommendations, and no required responses); SAN BERNARDINO,
2007–2008 REPORT, supra note 283, at 37–40 (no findings, three recommendations, and no
required responses).  The grand juries in all other years made no findings, no recommendations, 
and no required responses.  See generally  SAN BERNARDINO, 2016–2017 REPORT, supra
note 283; SAN BERNARDINO, 2015–2016 REPORT, supra note 283; SAN BERNARDINO, 2014– 
2015 REPORT, supra note 283; SAN BERNARDINO, 2013–2014 REPORT, supra note 283; SAN 
BERNARDINO, 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 283; SAN BERNARDINO, 2011–2012 REPORT,
supra note 283; SAN BERNARDINO, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 283; SAN BERNARDINO,
2009–2010 REPORT, supra note 283. 
285. SAN BERNARDINO, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 283, at ii.
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The four cases identified were Craft v. County of San Bernardino,286 
Plata v. Schwarzenegger,287 McKibben v. McMahon,288 and Turner v. San 
Bernardino County.289  Several facilities within the San Bernardino County 
Jail system were implicated in two cases.290 
Allegations in Craft related to unwarranted strip searches often
conducted in the view of jailors and detainees of the opposite sex at San 
Bernardino Jail’s Central Detention Center, San Bernardino County Jail, 
and San Bernardino Jail’s West Valley Detention Center.291 
Plata was a class action claim alleging that inadequacies in the provision
of medical healthcare services in the State’s prisons violated prisoners’ 
Eighth Amendment rights.292  The court subsequently made a finding that
the California Institution for Men (CIM) failed to provide adequate healthcare 
where, inter alia, a single nurse screened from 100 to 180 incoming prisoners 
each day.293  A later court-ordered evaluation in 2013 by medical experts
found CIM was not providing adequate medical care to patients, and that 
there were systemic issues that presented an ongoing serious risk of harm 
to patients.294 
In McKibben, inmates at the San Bernardino County Jail’s West Valley 
Detention Center alleged that those who identified as gay, lesbian, or 
transgender were transferred and isolated from the general population, where 
they were denied equal access to opportunities to reduce their sentences, 
services, and programs and facilities.295  The inmates also alleged that they 
were often treated in an abusive and neglectful manner, being subject to 
derogatory name-calling and severe disciplinary measures.296 
286.  Craft v. County of San Bernardino, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
287. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 603 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Brown
v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
288. McKibben v. McMahon, No. 5:14-cv-02171, 2019 WL 1109683 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
28, 2019). 
289. Turner v. County of San Bernardino, No. 5:16-cv-00355-VAP, 2018 WL
6617638 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2018). 
290. See Craft, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 1115–16; Class Action Complaint for Damages 
and Injunctive Relief at 1, McKibben, 2018 WL 1109683 (Oct. 22, 2014) (No. 5:14-cv-
02171) [hereinafter Complaint, McKibben).
291. See Craft, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. 
292.  Plata, 603 F.3d at 1090–91. 
293. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re Appointment of Receiver ¶ 53, 
Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 2005 WL 2932253 (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 3:01-cv-
01351-TEH) [hereinafter Findings]. 
294. See JOE GOLDENSON, MADIE LAMARRE & MIKE PUISIS, CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION 
FOR MEN (CIM) HEALTH CARE EVALUATION 5 (2013), https://cchcs.ca.gov/wp-content/
uploads/sites/60/2017/08/Plata-Expert-Report-CIM.pdf [https://perma.cc/37MM-5LX3].
295. Complaint, McKibben, supra note 290, at 1. 
296.  Id. at 1, 4. 
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In Turner, the class action alleged that the county had policies and
practices of using unnecessary force to control behavior or maintain order,
denying inmates minimally adequate health care, and failing to adequately
supervise and classify individuals to ensure that they do not face an
unreasonable risk of injury and violence from other incarcerated individuals.297 
The class allegations related to facilities within the San Bernardino County
Jail system.298 
The San Bernardino County CGJ originally adopted an unstructured, 
narrative report style for its inspections of public prisons up to and including 
fiscal year 2010–2011.299  Thereafter, its reports follow a standard format.300 
It modified and used the document entitled “Inspection Form” included in 
the Jail Inspection Handbook for Grand Jurors provided by the California 
Board of State and Community Corrections.301  Reviewed as a whole, the
grand juries inspected public prisons as required but their reports were not 
particularly informative. In the case of most inspections, the juries pronounced 
themselves satisfied with what they saw and heard.302 
Reports prior to the fiscal year 2011–2012 are usually terse and have 
little narrative discussion.303  For example, the report for the year 2007–
2008 details inspections of ten facilities, eight of which are dealt with in 
a matrix on a single page.304  In the case of one large facility, the Adelanto 
Detention Facility, the inspection report states simply: “This is a well run, 
Type II facility with 706 beds and is self-sufficient.  Staff includes a full-
time nurse.  There are plans to expand.  Budgeted to include 2,074 beds by 
297. See Turner v. County of San Bernardino, No. 5:16-cv-00355-VAP, 2018 WL 
6617638 at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2018). 
298. See id.
 299. See generally SAN BERNARDINO, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 283, at 45–47;
SAN BERNARDINO, 2009–2010 REPORT, supra note 283, at 24–32; SAN BERNARDINO, 2008– 
2009 REPORT, supra note 283, at 40–51; SAN BERNARDINO, 2007–2008 REPORT, supra note 
283, at 37–40. 
300. Compare SAN BERNARDINO, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 283, at 45–47 
(describing the jails in narrative form), with SAN BERNARDINO, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra 
note 283, at 34–35 (analyzing the jails with forms and prerecorded questions). 
301. See CAL. BD. OF STATE & CMTY. CORR., supra note 85, at 9.
 302. See, e.g., SAN BERNARDINO, 2013–2014 REPORT, supra note 283, at 12
(“Conclusion: There were no discrepancies found at any of the five County Detention 
Centers the Grand inspected. All personnel during each site visited were knowledgeable 
and professional.”).
303. See sources cited supra note 300 and accompanying text. 
304. SAN BERNARDINO, 2007–2008 REPORT, supra note 283, at 36. 
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2010.  All areas clean, well staffed and safe.”305  In essence the evaluation 
proper is the first and last sentences—a mere twenty-one words for a large 
facility.306 Two facilities, the Central Detention Center and the West Valley
Detention Center, merit a more extensive treatment and each gets two 
pages.307  Although the reports are longer, they fail to make substantial 
recommendations.308  The only formal findings recorded are that both 
facilities were understaffed and more staff should be recruited.309 
Despite the allegations in Craft of unwarranted and demeaning strip 
searches at the West Valley Detention Center,310 the 2007–2008 report gives 
no indication the jury sought to satisfy itself whether there had been any 
reoccurrences of that conduct.311  This is so even though Craft was settled 
in September 2007 with district court approval in April 2008—both events 
occurring within the fiscal year 2007–2008.312  The eventual cost to the county 
was in excess of $31 million in damages and class attorneys’ fees.313 
Reports in subsequent years do not disclose any special inquiries being
made about possible repetitions of these searches.314 
The 2007–2008 report notes that “[t]he most pressing problem this facility 
faces is inmate medical problems.  The number of medical problems plaguing 
inmates has increased dramatically in the past few years.”315  The inadequacies
of San Bernardino’s inmate healthcare system had been the subject of the 
court’s attention in Plata, albeit at the California Institute for Men.316 
Despite the CGJ reporting of its inspection at West Valley Detention Center 
that “[t]hree to five deputies can be off the premises at any given time, 
305. Id.
 306. See id.
 307. Id. at 37–40. 
308. See id.  For example, the “findings” at the CDC in the 2007–2008 Final Report 
are largely statistical without much analysis, followed by either one or two recommendations.
See id.
 309.  Id. at 38, 40. 
310. Craft v. County of San Bernardino, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
311. See generally SAN BERNARDINO, 2007–2008 REPORT, supra note 283, at 36–40
(no mention of strip searches or related issues). 
312. Craft, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 1116 (detailing class funds as $25,648,204, attorneys’ 
fees as $6,375,000, and counsel costs as $70,564.64); see Stipulated Order Granting
Preliminary Approval to Class Settlement at 1, Craft, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (No. 5:05-cv-
00359-SGL-OP). 
313. See Craft, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. 
314. See e.g., SAN BERNARDINO, 2013–2014 REPORT, supra note 283, at 12; SAN 
BERNARDINO, 2009–2010 REPORT, supra note 283, at 24–32.  But see SAN BERNARDINO, 
2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 283, at 43 (recommending that Big Bear Station, a twenty-
two bed facility, hire additional female staff to cope with searches of female subjects).  
Still, later in that same report, the civil grand jury makes no similar recommendation or 
finding for West Valley Detention Center.  Id. at 50–51. 
315. SAN BERNARDINO, 2007–2008 REPORT, supra note 283, at 39. 
316. Findings, supra note 293, at *13–*14. 
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accompanying inmates to local hospitals for highly specialized treatment,”317 
it made no special findings or recommendations regarding healthcare at 
the facility.318 Subsequent reports were similarly silent on this issue.319 
Our review of CGJ inspections of public prisons in the period studied
suggests that pending or recently settled civil rights litigation involving 
the county seemed to play little part in shaping grand juries’ inquiries. 
H. Jail Conditions in San Luis Obispo County 
San Luis Obispo County is one of five medium population counties 
selected for evaluation. During the fiscal years 2007–2017, the county’s
CGJs made a total of eighty-five recorded jail and detention facility inspections 
or visits according to their annual reports.320  CGJs made forty-eight jail
317. SAN BERNARDINO, 2007–2008 REPORT, supra note 283, at 39. 
318. See id. at 40. 
319. See generally  SAN BERNARDINO, 2016–2017 REPORT, supra note 283; SAN 
BERNARDINO, 2015–2016 REPORT, supra note 283; SAN BERNARDINO, 2014–2015 REPORT, 
supra note 283; SAN BERNARDINO, 2013–2014 REPORT, supra note 283; SAN BERNARDINO, 
2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 283; SAN BERNARDINO, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 
283; SAN BERNARDINO, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 283; SAN BERNARDINO, 2009– 
2010 REPORT, supra note 283; SAN BERNARDINO, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 283. 
320. See 2016–2017 SAN LUIS OBISPO CTY. GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 32, 89
(2017) (eleven) [hereinafter SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2016–2017 REPORT]; 2014–2015 SAN LUIS 
OBISPO CTY. GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 71–72, 97 (2015) (nine) [hereinafter SAN LUIS 
OBISPO, 2014–2015 REPORT]; 2013–2014 SAN LUIS OBISPO CTY. GRAND JURY, COUNTY 
JAIL, JUVENILE HALL AND HOLDING CELLS: INSPECTION AND INFORMATION REPORT 1 
(2014) (twelve) [hereinafter SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2013–2014 REPORT]; 2012–2013 SAN LUIS 
OBISPO CTY. GRAND JURY, CALIFORNIA MEN’S COLONY INSPECTION REPORT 1–2 (2013) 
(three) [hereinafter SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2012–2013 CMC REPORT]; 2012–2013 SAN LUIS 
OBISPO CTY. GRAND JURY, COUNTY JAIL, JUVENILE HALL AND HOLDING CELLS: INSPECTION 
AND INFORMATION REPORT 1–2 (2013) (twelve) [hereinafter SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2012–2013 
JAIL REPORT]; 2011–2012 SAN LUIS OBISPO CTY. GRAND JURY, CALIFORNIA MEN’S 
COLONY INSPECTION REPORT 1-2, 7 (2012) (two) [hereinafter SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2011–2012 
CMC REPORT]; 2011–2012 SAN LUIS OBISPO CTY. GRAND JURY, COUNTY JAIL, JUVENILE 
HALL AND HOLDING CELLS: INSPECTION AND INFORMATION REPORT 1 (2012) (ten) 
[hereinafter SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2011–2012 JAIL REPORT]; 2010–2011 SAN LUIS OBISPO 
CTY. GRAND JURY, INSPECTION OF COUNTY PRISONS, JAILS AND ALLIED AGENCIES 1 (2011) 
(thirteen) [hereinafter SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2010–2011 REPORT]; 2008–2009 SAN LUIS 
OBISPO CTY. GRAND JURY, CALIFORNIA MEN’S COLONY INSPECTION REPORT 2 (2009) (two) 
[hereinafter SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2008–2009 REPORT]; 2007–2008 SAN LUIS OBISPO CTY. 
GRAND JURY, CALIFORNIA MEN’S COLONY FROM THE INSIDE 1 (2008) (two) [hereinafter 
SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2007–2008 CMC REPORT]; 2007–2008 SAN LUIS OBISPO CTY. GRAND 
JURY, SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY JAIL 1 (2008) (one) [hereinafter SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2007– 
2008 JAIL REPORT]; 2007–2008 SAN LUIS OBISPO CTY. GRAND JURY, SHORT TERM 
HOLDING CELLS 1 (2008) (eight) [hereinafter SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2007–2008 HOLDING CELL 
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findings, gave twenty-one recommendations, and required nine institutional
responses.321 
Our examination of jail condition litigation reports for cases whose 
cause of action arose or was ongoing within the same period revealed one 
case whose cause of action arose or was ongoing within the same period
where we judged that a CGJ might reasonably have been expected to
detect or make findings about at least one of the circumstances giving rise 
to the litigation. The number of public prisons within the county varied
throughout the period studied—but the highest recorded figures were the 
twelve inspected in 2012–2013.322 
The case identified was Brown v. Plata.323  In that case the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized that the chronic overcrowding of California’s prisons 
constituted “cruel and unusual punishment” contrary to the Eight 
REPORT]. See generally 2015–2016 SAN LUIS OBISPO CTY. GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT
(2016) (zero listed) [hereinafter SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2015–2016 REPORT].  There were no
jail reports for the fiscal year 2009–2010 listed on the San Luis Obispo County’s grand
jury website. See Forms & Documents > Grand Jury Reports, Grand Jury San Luis Obispo
County, https://www.slocounty.ca.gov/Departments/Grand-Jury/Forms-Documents/Grand- Jury-
Reports.aspx [https://perma.cc/CAC3-TFTG].  This website provides access to the grand 
jury reports for all years studied, which are housed in a Google Drive folder.  See id. 
 321. See SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2016–2017 REPORT, supra note 320, at 41–42, 56–59, 94– 
95 (sixteen findings, five recommendations, four required responses); SAN LUIS OBISPO, 
2014–2015 REPORT, supra note 320, at 77, 102–03 (ten findings, seven recommendations, 
one required response); SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2013–2014 REPORT, supra note 320, at 14–15 
(no findings, recommendations, or required responses); SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2012–2013 
CMC REPORT, supra note 320, at 1–10 (no findings, recommendations, or required 
responses); SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2012–2013 JAIL REPORT, supra note 320, at 19–22 (twelve 
findings, six recommendations, two required responses); SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2011–2012 
CMC REPORT, supra note 320, at 7–8 (no findings, recommendations, or required responses); 
SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2011–2012 JAIL REPORT, supra note 320, at 10–11 (nine findings, three 
recommendations, two required responses); SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra
note 320, at 10–11 (no findings, recommendations, or required responses); SAN LUIS OBISPO,
2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 320, at 5 (no findings, recommendations, or required 
responses); SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2007–2008 CMC REPORT, supra note 320, at 7 (no findings, 
recommendations, or required responses); SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2007–2008 JAIL REPORT,
supra note 320, at 1–2 (2008) (no findings, recommendations, or required responses); SAN 
LUIS OBISPO, 2007–2008 HOLDING CELL REPORT, supra note 320, at 4 (one finding, no 
recommendations, no required responses).  See generally SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2015–2016
REPORT, supra note 320 (zero listed).  There were no jail reports for the fiscal year 2009–
2010 listed on the San Luis Obispo County’s grand jury website.  See Forms & Documents
> Grand Jury Reports, supra note 320. 
322. SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2012–2013 CMC REPORT, supra note 320, at 1–2 (twelve 
inspections); SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2012–2013 JAIL REPORT, supra note 320, at 1–2 (three 
inspections). 
323.  Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
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Amendment.324  An incidental harm was the inability of California’s prison 
system to deliver appropriate medical care to inmates.325 
San Luis Obispo County is home to California Men’s Colony (CMC), 
the third largest prison in California with a designed capacity of 3,884
inmates.326 The 2007–2008 CGJ stated that, when inspected in October 
2007, it was holding 6,465 inmates,327 and remarked: “With the overcrowding 
and the antiquated facility, the Grand Jury concludes CMC functions well 
in part because of inmate cooperation and well trained staff.”328 
We looked to see whether San Luis Obispo County CGJs picked up on
overcrowding and inadequate healthcare at CMC as a significant problem.
We also looked to see whether these issues merited greater attention after 
the decision in Brown. During the study period, the CGJs produced special 
reports on CMC in 2007–2008,329 2008–2009,330 2011–2012,331 2012– 
2013,332 and 2014–2015,333 effectively two reports before Brown, one 
immediately after the decision, and a further two in the following years.334 
There was a regular jail inspection report in the decision year 2010–2011.335 
Reports for the years 2007–2008 and 2008–2009 both reported figures 
showing the prison was holding substantially more inmates than its design 
capacity—CMC was running at 166% capacity in 2007–2008.336  Neither 
CGJ commented adversely on this, made any formal findings, nor required 
responses to address the issue.337  Similarly, the reports briefly mentioned 
physical and mental health support at the facility but without comment as 
to its adequacy for the needs of a prison running at 166% of capacity.338 
324. See id. at 499–502. 
325.  Id. at 500, 522. 
326. SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 320, at 2.
 327. SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2007–2008 CMC REPORT, supra note 320, at 2.
328. Id. at 7. 
329. See SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2007–2008 CMC REPORT, supra note 320. 
330. See SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 320. 
331. See SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2011–2012 CMC REPORT, supra note 320. 
332. See SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2012–2013 CMC REPORT, supra note 320. 
333. See SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2014–2015 REPORT, supra note 320, at 97–103. 
334. The Supreme Court decided Brown in 2011.  Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
335. See SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 320. 
336. SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2007–2008 CMC REPORT, supra note 320, at 2; see also SAN
LUIS OBISPO, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 320, at 2. 
 337. See SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 320, at 5; SAN LUIS OBISPO,
2007–2008 CMC REPORT, supra note 320, at 7. 
338. See SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 320, at 5; SAN LUIS OBISPO,
2007–2008 CMC REPORT, supra note 320, at 7. 
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The juries’ focus was chiefly upon the educational and vocational programs 
offered at the facility.339 
The report for 2010–2011, the year in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
announced its decision in Brown,340 includes a report of an inspection of 
CMC.341  The date of the CGJ’s inspection of the facility is not stated,342 
so we cannot say whether the CGJ had in mind issues regarding overcrowding 
and healthcare raised in oral argument or the Court’s opinion and which 
might have prompted attention to these issues.  However, unlike the previous
reports mentioned, this report states in its summary: 
The County Women’s Jail and the CMC Medical/Health Facility caused 
concern. The jail is overcrowded and its facilities are unable to accommodate
total bedding requirements.  The CMC Medical/Health facility is antiquated 
and difficult for staff to manage.  Fortunately, both facilities have received
funding for upgrades and improvements over the next three years.343 
There was more detailed discussion of the Medical/Health Department in
the body of the report in which it noted: “The CMC Medical/Health
facility is antiquated and difficult for staff to manage.”344  The CGJ ended 
on a more optimistic note: “Fortunately, groundbreaking has started on a 
new medical facility that will better accommodate inmate health needs.”345 
It should be noted that the CGJ made no formal recommendations and
required no responses to this report.346 
Although no mention is made of it in the report,347 the 2011–2012 
inspection report should have been made with the benefit of knowledge 
of the decision in Brown and the Court’s criticisms of the California prison 
system as a whole.  It noted that as a result of AB 109, the population 
of CMC was falling,348 and that demand for medical services was similarly 
339. See SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 320, at 3–5; SAN LUIS 
OBISPO, 2007–2008 CMC REPORT, supra note 320, at 2–7. 
340. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).  The U.S. Supreme Court announced its
decision in Brown v. Plata on May 23, 2011.  Id.  The 2010–2011 CGJ’s fiscal year ended 
on June 30, 2011.  See About the Grand Jury, GRAND JURY SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY, 
https://www.slocounty.ca.gov/Departments/Grand-Jury/About-the-Grand-Jury.aspx [https://
perma.cc/5DC2-JSXK] (“The County of San Luis Obispo impanels a civil grand jury
every year. Its term coincides with the county’s fiscal year, July 1st–June 30th.”).  Oral 
argument had taken place on November 30, 2010. Brown, 563 U.S. at 493. 
341. See SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 320, at 2–6. 
342.  See id. 
 343. Id. at 1. 
344. Id. at 4. 
345. Id. at 5. 
346. See generally id. at 2–6. 
347.  See generally SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2011–2012 CMC REPORT, supra note 320. 
348. Id. at 2–3. 
654
OAKES_57-3_POST OAKES PAGES FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2020 11:28 AM    
 
    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
  
  
       
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
      
 
[VOL. 57:  609, 2020] California’s Civil Grand Juries 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
declining.349 It made no formal recommendations and required no responses 
to its report.350 
The 2012–2013 CGJ’s report notes a further fall in the inmate population 
at CMC.351  The prison remained overcrowded at approximately 132% of 
design capacity,352 a figure just 5.5% below the maximum permitted under 
Brown v. Plata.353  There is some description of CMC’s medical and psychiatric 
facilities but no discussion of their adequacy.354  The jury seemed more 
concerned about the underuse of one secure psychiatric ward.355 
In March 2013, medical experts appointed pursuant to the federal 
court’s order356 filed their report concluding that CMC “will be providing 
adequate medical care once the significant problems in pharmacy services, 
medication administration, and the health care physical plant are corrected.”357 
Issues identified by the experts in their caveats were not picked up by
previous CGJs.  CMC was not inspected in the year 2013–2014 and the 
next report was that of 2014–2015.358  The 2014–2015 CGJ did not investigate
the state of the outstanding issue mentioned by the experts or comment on 
their report.359  The CGJ report identifies the major issue facing CMC as “the 
state of religious life” at the facility.360 
Our review of CGJ inspections of CMC in the period studied suggests
that the Brown civil rights litigation involving conditions at, inter alia, CMC 
seemed to play little part in shaping grand juries’ inquiries.  Overcrowding 
349. Id. at 5–6. 
350. See id. at 7–8. 
351. SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2012–2013 CMC REPORT, supra note 320, at 3–4. 
352.  See id. at 3–4 (noting the population at CMC as 1,996 inmates on the west side 
and 3,146 on the east side for a total of 5,142 inmates at the facility); SAN LUIS OBISPO,
2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 320, at 2 (indicating the total design capacity of CMC is 
3,884 inmates). 
353. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 509–10 (2011) (mandating California to reduce 
its prison population under 137.5% of its designed capacity). 
354. SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2012–2013 CMC REPORT, supra note 320, at 4–5. 
355. Id. at 4. 
356. See Order Re: Receivership Transition Plan and Expert Evaluations at 8–10, 
Plata v. Brown, No. 3:01-cv-01351-TEH (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5, 2012), https://www.clearing 
house.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-0018-0098.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VJC-9NN7].
357. JOE GOLDENSON, MADIE LAMARRE & MIKE PUISIS, CALIFORNIA MEN’S COLONY 
HEALTH CARE EVALUATION 5 (2013), https://cchcs.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/60/
2017/08/Plata-Expert-Report-CMC.pdf [https://perma.cc/WSX2-RXPY].
358. See Forms & Documents > Grand Jury Reports, supra note 320; see also SAN
LUIS OBISPO, 2014–2015 REPORT, supra note 320, at 97–103. 
359. See generally SAN LUIS OBISPO, 2014–2015 REPORT, supra note 320, at 97–103.
 360. Id. at 98. 
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was mentioned in passing in a number of early inspections but CGJs did 
not seem overly concerned and made no specific recommendations for 
reduction.361 
I. Civil Grand Jury Reports on Jail Conditions in 
Remaining Counties 
In this final part, we look at the remaining six counties that were not
evaluated against civil rights litigation allegations made during the study 
period and appearing on the Clearinghouse website.  These comprised one 
large population county—Santa Clara County, three medium sized population 
counties—Merced, Tulare, and Yolo counties, and two small population
counties—Calaveras and Mendocino counties.
Santa Clara County is difficult to comment upon because the extent of 
public prison inspections carried out by its CGJs is unclear.  While it is 
possible that its CGJs were regularly inspecting public prisons in accordance
with their statutory duty, if they did so then they chose not to publicize
details of these inspections in their final reports.362  If the published final
361. See supra notes 326–55 and accompanying text. 
362. See Civil Grand Jury Reports Archive, SUPERIOR COURT CAL. COUNTY SANTA 
CLARA, http://www.scscourt.org/court_divisions/civil/cgj/grand_jury_archive.shtml#17
[https://perma.cc/AZ7G-CD53] (showing no reports for 2009–2010, 2010–2011, 2013–
2014, and 2016–2017).  See generally 2015–2016 SANTA CLARA CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, 
ADDRESSING MENTAL ILLNESS IN SANTA CLARA COUNTY JAILS 1–25 (2016), http://
www.scscourt.org/court_divisions/civil/cgj/2016/MentalIllnessJail.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
66EC-27DL] [hereinafter SANTA CLARA, 2015–2016 REPORT]; 2014–2015 SANTA CLARA
CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, THE PUBLIC IS UNDERSERVED: EDUCATIONAL AND VOCATIONAL 
NEEDS FOR WOMEN INMATES AT ELMWOOD 1–22 (2015), http://www.scscourt.org/court_ 
divisions/civil/cgj/2015/Educational%20&%20Vocational%20Needs%20for%20Women
%20Inmates%20at%20Elmwood%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5AJ-85DN] [hereinafter
SANTA CLARA, 2014–2015 REPORT]; 2012–2013 SANTA CLARA CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY,
DOES ELMWOOD CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX EXERCISE REASONABLE INMATE RELEASE 
PROCEDURES? 1–4 (2013), http://www.scscourt.org/court_divisions/civil/cgj/2013/elmwood.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VWP2-BB55] [hereinafter SANTA CLARA, 2012–2013 ELMWOOD REPORT];
2012–2013 SANTA CLARA CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, JUVENILE HALL–ON THE RIGHT TRACK 
1 (2013), http://www.scscourt.org/court_divisions/civil/cgj/2013/jhall.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
DZA3-R2WB] [hereinafter SANTA CLARA, 2012–2013 JUVENILE HALL REPORT]; 2011– 
2012 SANTA CLARA CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, AB 109/AB 117 REALIGNMENT: IS SANTA 
CLARA COUNTY READY FOR PRISON REFORM? 1–16 (2012), https://www.scscourt.org/cou 
rt_divisions/civil/cgj/2012/CriminalRealignment.pdf [https://perma.cc/5yK3-4ZGC]; 2008–2009
SANTA CLARA CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION/FACILITIES AND 
FLEET, A BROKEN RELATIONSHIP IN NEED OF REPAIR 1–11 (2009), http://www.scs.court. 
org/court_divisions/civil/cgj/2009/DeptOfCorrectionFacilitiesAndFleet.pdf [https:// perma.cc/
5HQG-JEAF] [hereinafter SANTA CLARA, 2008–2009 REPORT]; 2007–2008 SANTA CLARA 
CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, ELMWOOD CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX: A CONTINUING THREAT TO 
COMMUNITY SAFETY 1–5 (2008), http://www.scscourt.org/court_divisions/civil/cgj/2008/
ElmwoodCommunitySafety.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BHN-VJ5V] [hereinafter SANTA CLARA,
2007–2008 REPORT]. 
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reports of the grand jury website are comprehensive, then no inspections 
were carried out in the years 2009–2010, 2010–2011, 2013–2014, and 2016–
2017.363  By the standards of other large population counties, the number 
of reported inspections is surprisingly low: a single inspection in one 
year,364 two inspections in two years,365 and three inspections in three years.366 
During the whole study period, the county’s CGJs carried out a total of 
fourteen reported inspections.367  This stands in stark contrast to the other 
four high population counties: Alameda County—51 reported inspections;368 
Los Angeles County—1,069 reported inspections;369 Orange County—144 
reported inspections;370 San Bernardino County—53 reported inspections.371 
During the study period, Santa Clara County was the subject of a class 
action filed in 2015 for its failure to safeguard inmates’ welfare.372  Subsequent 
to the study period, it entered into a consent decree to implement a remedial 
plan to meet the minimum level of health care necessary to fulfil its 
obligations under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, to ensure that 
unlawful force is not utilized in the jails, to avoid the unlawful use of segregated 
or restrictive housing in the jails, and to ensure compliance with the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act for inmates with psychiatric and/or intellectual disabilities.373  Although 
not explicitly mentioned in reports, it appears that the CGJs had been made 
aware of this continuing litigation and that this helped shape their inspections 
363. See Civil Grand Jury Reports Archive, supra note 362. 
364. See SANTA CLARA, 2007–2008 REPORT, supra note 362, at 1. 
365. See SANTA CLARA, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 362, at 3; SANTA CLARA,
2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 362, at 1. 
 366. See SANTA CLARA, 2015–2016 REPORT, supra note 362, at 3; SANTA CLARA,
2014–2015 REPORT, supra note 362, at 7; SANTA CLARA, 2012–2013 ELMWOOD REPORT, 
supra note 362, at 2; SANTA CLARA, 2012–2013 JUVENILE HALL REPORT, supra note 362, 
at 1. 
 367.  See supra notes 364–66 and accompanying text. 
368. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
369. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
370. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
371. See supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
372. See Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 1, Chavez
v. County of Santa Clara, No. 1:15-cv-05277-NJV (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 18, 2015),
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-CA-0123-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
88WN-FZZM] [hereinafter Complaint, Chavez].
373. Consent Decree at 1, 3, Chavez, No. 1:15-cv-05277-RMI, (Mar. 22, 2019), 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-CA-0123-0006.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5A9H-QXZ6]. 
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during the period after commencement of the suit.374 The plaintiffs were
confined at various times during the study period in the Main Jail North, 
Second East Maximum, and the Main Jail South’s Third West Maximum 
Unit.375  After commencement of the suit, Main Jail North was inspected 
during the study period.376 The jury considered certain issues the subject of 
complaint in the litigation at Main Jail North, specifically the use of force,377 
and medical treatment of mentally ill inmates.378  The CGJ concluded its
report by making a number of findings and recommendations aimed at 
improving conditions and treatment.379 
We conclude that although their reports do not evidence regular inspections
of all facilities, there is evidence that the CGJ acted upon allegations in
civil litigation and took early steps to recommend remedial action before 
the county entered a consent decree. 
Merced, Tulare, and Yolo counties all had a pattern of regular inspections
of public prisons in their respective counties.  Merced County CGJs showed
exceptional consistency in their findings of overcrowded conditions and
understaffing in the public prisons, complaining of both conditions in their 
reports for fiscal years 2007–2008, 2008–2009, 2009–2010, and 2010–
2011.380  The effect of Brown v. Plata is seen in the fact that their reports
subsequent to 2010–2011 no longer complain of overcrowding—but complaints 
of understaffing continue in reports for years 2011–2012, 2013–2014, and 
374. See 2017–2018 CIVIL GRAND JURY OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, REPORT ON 
DETENTION FACILITIES IN THE ERA OF REFORM 11–14 (2018), http://www.scscourt.org/
court_divisions/civil/cgj/2018/Detention_Facilities05212018.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WHG-
ESK5] (“Treatment for the mentally ill and transitional services were identified as critical
areas in the current jail reform efforts.”); SANTA CLARA, 2015–2016 REPORT, supra note 
362, at 18–19 (“The unfortunate truth about the County jails is that they have become 
jail/prison hybrids and warehouses for the mentally ill . . . . They have had difficulty expanding 
services to meet the needs of the increasing mentally ill population in the jails.”). 
375. Complaint, Chavez, supra note 372, at 3–4. 
376. See SANTA CLARA, 2015–2016 REPORT, supra note 362, at 4. 
377.  Id. at 5, 11–12, 14–15. 
378. Id. at 5–6, 15–19. 
379. Id. at 19–22. 
380. See MERCED CTY., CIVIL GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 2010–2011, at 26 (2011),
https://mercedcourt.org/files/2010_2011_civil_gj_final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/26VY-
AYNV]; MERCED CTY. GRAND JURY, 2009–2010 FINAL REPORT 2, 4 (2010), https://www.
co.merced.ca.us/DocumentCenter/View/3503/grand_jury_final_report_2009_2010_sml?bi
dId= [https://perma.cc/8BVG-GUJ4]; 2008–09 MERCED CTY. GRAND JURY, GRAND JURY 
FINAL REPORT 10, 38 (2009), https://www.co.merced.ca.us/DocumentCenter/ View/2424/ 
gj_report_08-09?bidId= [https://perma.cc/999S-SVX9]; MERCED CTY. GRAND JURY,
GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT 2007–2008, at 16, 18–19 (2008), http://web2.co.merced.ca.us/pdfs/
grandjury/reports/Grand%20Jury%20Report%202007-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/HCY6-
7RF8]. 
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2016–2017.381 In their reports for 2013–2014 and 2016–2017, the CGJs 
report that facilities are outdated and in need of replacement.382  In short,
the Merced County CGJs were ahead of the game and aware of the dangers 
of overcrowded and understaffed prisons.  However, it is notable that the 
county did not appear to heed their complaints,383 and the recommendations 
on overcrowding stopped after the Supreme Court forced the State to 
address the overcrowding issue.384 
Tulare County CGJs conducted inspections in seven out of the ten years 
studied.385  It is accurate to say that they found nothing of substance to
complain of in the conditions they observed.  There are no reports of
overcrowding or understaffing or calls for new facilities.386 
381. See MERCED CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 2016–2017, at 12 (2017),
https://mercedcourt.org/files/FinalReport2016-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/R75C-NGLD]
[hereinafter MERCED, 2016–2017 REPORT]; MERCED, 2013–2014 REPORT, supra note 106, 
at 3; MERCED CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 2011–2012, at 34 (2012), https:// 
mercedcourt.org/files/2012gjfinalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/35ME-XPVT] [hereinafter 
MERCED, 2011–2012 REPORT].
382. MERCED, 2016–2017 REPORT, supra note 381, at 11; MERCED, 2013–2014 REPORT,
supra note 106, at 2. 
383. This is apparent because the complaints were included in four consecutive CGJ
reports, from 2007 through 2011.  See supra note 380 and accompanying text. 
384. MERCED, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 381, at 34–38. 
385. See TULARE CTY. GRAND JURY, TULARE COUNTY GRAND JURY REPORT 2015– 
2016, at 30 (2016), https://tularecounty.ca.gov/grandjury/index.cfm/reports/2015-2016-
final-report-and-responses/2015-2016-final-report/ [https://perma.cc/N6BL-48VP] [hereinafter
TULARE, 2015–2016 REPORT]; TULARE CTY. GRAND JURY, TULARE COUNTY GRAND JURY
REPORT 2012–2013, at 43, 47 (2013), https://tularecounty.ca.gov/grandjury/index.cfm/
reports/2012-2013-final-report/ [https://perma.cc/VG4S-UK9G] [hereinafter TULARE, 2012–
2013 REPORT]; TULARE CTY. GRAND JURY, TULARE COUNTY GRAND JURY REPORT 2011– 
2012, at 19 (2012), https://tularecounty.ca.gov/grandjury/index.cfm/reports/2011-2012-
final-report/ [https://perma.cc/FN4T-CL67] [hereinafter TULARE, 2011–2012 REPORT];
TULARE CTY. GRAND JURY, TULARE COUNTY GRAND JURY REPORT 2010–2011, at 61 (2011), 
https://tularecounty.ca.gov/grandjury/index.cfm/reports/2010-2011-final-report/ [https://perma. 
cc/45CG-P39J] [hereinafter TULARE, 2010–2011 REPORT]; TULARE CTY. GRAND JURY, 
FINAL REPORT 2009–2010, at 54, 59 (2010), https://tularecounty.ca.gov/grandjury/index.
cfm/reports/2009-2010-final-report/ [https://perma.cc/JWJ8-TUWA] [hereinafter TULARE, 
2009–2010 REPORT]; TULARE CTY. GRAND JURY, 2008–2009 FINAL REPORT 41 (2009),
https://tularecounty.ca.gov/grandjury/index.cfm/reports/2008-2009-final-report/ [https://
perma.cc/AR6J-AU9A] [hereinafter TULARE, 2008–2009 REPORT]; TULARE CTY. GRAND 
JURY, TULARE COUNTY GRAND JURY REPORT 2007–2008, at 70 (2008), https://tularecounty.
ca.gov/grandjury/index.cfm/reports/20072008-final-report/ [https://perma.cc/S95L-RN92]
[hereinafter TULARE, 2007–2008 REPORT].
386. See generally TULARE, 2015–2016 REPORT, supra note 385, at 30–32; TULARE,
2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 385, at 43–49; TULARE, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 
385, at 19–21; TULARE, 2010–2011 REPORT, supra note 385, at 60–62; TULARE, 2009– 
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Yolo County CGJs complained of overcrowding in the years 2008–
2009 and 2010–2011,387 but, after the decision in Brown, there are no further 
complaints of overcrowded conditions.388  The 2008–2009 CGJ noted that
the Monroe Detention Center operated under a federal consent decree that 
capped inmate numbers.389  The facility was inadequate to cope with the
combination of population growth in the county and the practical necessity to 
segregate prisoners by gang, political or ideological persuasion, and sexual 
orientation.390  Compliance with the consent decree had necessitated early 
release of 3,031 inmates in 2009, including thirty-six convicted of felonies.391 
Calaveras County CGJs held regular inspections throughout the period.392 
The opening report for the study period included a call for the county to 
build a new county jail.393  The subsequent report in 2008–2009 noted that
2010 REPORT, supra note 385, at 54–55, 59–62; TULARE, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 
385, at 41–46; TULARE, 2007–2008 REPORT, supra note 385, at 70–71. 
387. 2010–2011 YOLO CTY. GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 47–48 (2011), https://www.
yolocounty.org/home/showdocument?id=16779 [https://perma.cc/N767-5QF8]; 2008–2009
YOLO CTY. GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 11–13 (2009), https://www.yolocounty.org/home/ 
showdocument?id=9860 [https://perma.cc/8NF3-YL6C] [hereinafter YOLO, 2008–2009
REPORT].
388. See, e.g., 2015–16 YOLO CTY. GRAND JURY, YOLO COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE 
DETENTION FACILITY REVIEW 1–5 (2016), https://www.yolocounty.org/home/showdocument?
id=35550 [https://perma.cc/55RD-L4LA]; 2012–2013 YOLO CTY. GRAND JURY, FINAL 
REPORT 27–32 (2013), https://www.yolocounty.org/home/showdocument?id=22984 
[https://perma.cc/WLA9-RP5H].
389. YOLO, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 387, at 11–12. 
390. Id. at 12. See generally Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern 
Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing merits of L.A. County Jail’s segregated 
K6G unit that houses gay men and trans women separate from the general populations); 
John J. Gibbons & Nicholas De B. Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement: A Report of the 
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 385 
(2006) (arguing against the trend in the late 1990s of increasingly segregated prison 
populations because segregation leads to higher rates of recidivism and prison violence). 
391. 2009/2010 YOLO CTY. GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 27 (2010), https://www.yolo
county.org/home/showdocument?id=13542 [https://perma.cc/EFU2-NNU4]; see also YOLO,
2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 387, at 11–12 (providing background on the consent decree). 
392. See CALAVERAS CTY. GRAND JURY 2016–2017 FINAL REPORT 39, 53 (2017);
CALAVERAS CTY. GRAND JURY, 2015–2016 FINAL REPORT 21, 31 (2016); CALAVERAS CTY. 
GRAND JURY, 2014–2015 FINAL REPORT 11, 14 (2015); CALAVERAS CTY. 2013–2014 
GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 4 (2014) [hereinafter CALAVERAS, 2013–2014 REPORT];
CALAVERAS CTY. 2011–2012 GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 29 (2012) [hereinafter CALAVERAS, 
2011–2012 REPORT]; CALAVERAS CTY. 2010–2011 GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 23 (2011) 
[hereinafter CALAVERAS, 2010–2011 REPORT]; 2009–2010 GRAND JURY, CALAVERAS 
CTY., FINAL REPORT 17 (2010) [hereinafter CALAVERAS, 2009–2010 REPORT]; 2008–2009 
GRAND JURY, CALAVERAS CTY., FINAL REPORT 33 (2009) [hereinafter CALAVERAS, 2008– 
2009 REPORT]; CALAVERAS CTY. GRAND JURY, 2007–2008 FINAL REPORT 21, 23 (2008) 
[hereinafter CALAVERAS, 2007–2008 REPORT].  All of these reports are maintained in a 
database on the Calaveras County Grand Jury website.  See Grand Jury Reports, CALAVERAS 
COUNTY, https://grandjury.calaverasgov.us/Reports#gsc.tab=0 [https://perma.cc/KV85-G4Z2].
393. CALAVERAS, 2007–2008 REPORT, supra note 392, at 25. 
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a new jail was to be built so the jury was not commenting on the state of 
the county jail.394  Reports for 2010–2011 and 2011–2012 repeat these comments 
but also note understaffing at the jail.395  The report for 2013–2014 details 
an inspection of the new jail.396  Later reports have nothing of substance
to note.  We cannot gauge the influence of the CGJ’s report, but there is 
clear evidence that Calaveras County’s CGJ was aware of the dangers of 
poor conditions and understaffing. 
Mendocino CGJ reports detail inspections for all years up to fiscal year 
2012–2013,397 but thereafter there are no reports of jail inspections.398 The 
394. CALAVERAS, 2009–2010 REPORT, supra note 392, at 33. 
395. CALAVERAS, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 392, at 29–30; CALAVERAS, 2010– 
2011 REPORT, supra note 392, at 23–24. 
396. CALAVERAS, 2013–2014 REPORT, supra note 392, at 4, 57–59. 
397. See 2012–2013 MENDOCINO CTY. GRAND JURY, CUT BACKS IN MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVICES IMPACTING LAW ENFORCEMENT 2 (2013), https://www.mendocinocounty.org/home/ 
showdocument?id=3692 [https://perma.cc/G9MW-3SUN]; 2012–2013 MENDOCINO CTY.
GRAND JURY, INMATE NUTRITION 1–2 (2013), https://www.mendocinocounty.org/home/ 
showdocument?id=3642 [https://perma.cc/XNA4-5AX5]; 2011–2012 MENDOCINO CTY. 
GRAND JURY, PROVIDING EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MENDOCINO COUNTY 1 (2012),
https://www.mendocinocounty.org/home/showdocument?id=3572 [https://perma.cc/3WNX-
REZP] [hereinafter MENDOCINO, 2011–2012 REPORT]; 2010–2011 MENDOCINO CTY. GRAND 
JURY, FINAL REPORT 47–62 (2011), https://www.mendocinocounty.org/home/showdocument
?id=3334 [https://perma.cc/JD5X-4HAP] [hereinafter MENDOCINO, 2010–2011 REPORT]; 
2010 MENDOCINO CTY. GRAND JURY, ARREST A PLUMBER - FIX THE JAIL! A REPORT ON THE
MENDOCINO COUNTY JAIL AND COURTHOUSE HOLDING CELLS 1 (2010), https://www.mendo 
cinocounty.org/home/showdocument?id=3818 [https://perma.cc/V5U4-BGBV] [hereinafter
MENDOCINO, 2009–2010 REPORT]; 2010 MENDOCINO CTY. GRAND JURY, OPEN A SCHOOL 
DOOR, CLOSE A JAIL CELL, A REPORT ON MENDOCINO COUNTY JUVENILE HALL 1 (2010), 
https://www.mendocinocounty.org/home/showdocument?id=3840 [https://perma.cc/BSX4-
MP3U]; 2010 MENDOCINO CTY. GRAND JURY, DOING COMMUNITY SERVICE! A REPORT ON
CHAMBERLAIN CREEK AND PARLIN FORK CONSERVATION CAMPS 2 (2010), https://www.
mendocinocounty.org/home/showdocument?id=3822 [https://perma.cc/NJ8B-9E7Y];
2008/2009 MENDOCINO GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 41 (2009), https://www.mendocino
county.org/home/showdocument?id=4128 [https://perma.cc/4DTB-JSCL] [hereinafter 
MENDOCINO, 2008–2009 REPORT]; 2007/2008 MENDOCINO GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 
57, 62 (2008), https://www.mendocinocounty.org/home/showdocument?id=4240 [https://perma.cc/
W8LC-2XHJ].
398. See generally 2016-2017 Reports, COUNTY MENDOCINO CAL., https://www.
mendocinocounty.org/government/grand-jury/2016-2017-reports [https://perma.cc/FD7X-
WG6X]; 2015-2016 Reports, COUNTY MENDOCINO CAL., https://www.mendocinocounty.org/ 
government/grand-jury/2015-2016-reports [https://perma.cc/YPG9-5R6U]; 2014-2015 Reports, 
COUNTY MENDOCINO CAL., https://www.mendocinocounty.org/government/grand-jury/ 
2014-2015-reports [https://perma.cc/JU8F-QN8N]; 2013-2014, COUNTY MENDOCINO CAL.,
https://www.mendocinocounty.org/government/grand-jury/past-reports/2013-2014-reports
[https://perma.cc/J3MB-FHJ2]. 
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report for the year 2008–2009 found overcrowding and disrepair and
recommended long-term planning for a new combined justice center.399 
Reports for the succeeding three years, 2009–2012, detailed understaffing 
at the jail but not overcrowding.400  There are no reports of inspections in 
the last four years of the study period.401  The lack of later reports makes
it difficult to reach a firm conclusion as to whether a new jail was built.  
We note that in 2019 the county settled a wrongful death suit for $5 
million relating to a 2014 death in the county jail.402  Although the CGJs 
in that and subsequent years likely knew of this lawsuit, they neglected to 
conduct any documented visits or review of jail policies and procedures 
following the prisoner’s death.403 
IV. DISCUSSION
It is beyond dispute that California has experienced an explosive growth 
in its prison population since 1980.404  Much of that expansion took place 
between 1980 and 1991 when the prison population more than quadrupled.405 
In their 1994 paper, Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawking document 
how California’s prison population of around 10,000 prisoners in 1950 
had burgeoned to nearly 90,000 by 1990.406 They note that the combined
jail and prison population in California increased from 28,946 in 1980 to 
70,845 by 1990.407  By its peak in 2008, that figure had more than doubled 
again to 172,856 prisoners.408 By 2010, immediately before the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata,409 that figure had fallen to 165,062.410 
The latest available figures show a prison population of 131,039 in 2017.411 
399. MENDOCINO, 2008–2009 REPORT, supra note 397, at 41–42. 
400. See MENDOCINO, 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 397, at 2; MENDOCINO, 2010– 
2011 REPORT, supra note 397, at 57; MENDOCINO, 2009–2010 REPORT, supra note 397, at 
2–3. 
401. See generally sources cited supra note 398. 
402. See Julie Johnson, Mendocino County Jail Death Results in $5 Million Settlement, 
PRESS DEMOCRAT (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.pressdemocrat.com/news/9381662-181/ 
mendocino-county-jail-death-results?sba=AAS [https://perma.cc/8TT7-7VEN].
403. See id.; see also supra note 401 and accompanying text.
404. Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, The Growth of Imprisonment in
California, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY (SPECIAL ISSUE) 83 (1994). 
405. Id.
 406. See id. at 84.
 407. Id. at 85. 
408. HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON 
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008 – STATISTICAL TABLES 6 (2009). 
409.  Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
410. PAUL GUERINO, PAIGE M. HARRISON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 14 (2012). 
411. See JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 2017, at 4 (2019). 
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The reason for this huge growth and modest decline are beyond the
scope of this Article.  However, the effects of explosive growth are all too 
obvious.  Building prisons, hiring and training staff, attending to prisoners’
medical needs, feeding and clothing them, and supervising parolees are all
things that require funding. While getting tough on crime and imposing 
longer sentences is popular with the electorate,412 paying for the consequences
of such a policy is not.  As far back as 1978, Californians expressed their 
dislike of taxation by passing the People’s Initiative to Limit Property 
Taxation, popularly known as Proposition 13, which amended the California 
Constitution, Article XIII so as to limit the maximum ad valorem taxes payable 
on real property.413  While Proposition 13 remains popular with voters,414 
412. The period studied in this Article spans one where “tough on crime” policies 
were initially popular as reflected in the current “three strikes” law—California Penal Code 
section 667—passed in 1994 and the failed proposition ballot to abolish capital punishment in 
California—Proposition 62.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2010); California Proposition 
62—Repeal Death Penalty—Results: Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017, 11:24 AM), 
https://nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/California-ballot-measure-62-repeal-death-
penalty [https://perma.cc/EH5S-ZFK9]; California’s Three Strikes Sentencing Law, supra
note 12.  One of the effects of this was endemic prison overcrowding leading to local jail 
populations caps and eventually the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown. See Brown, 
563 U.S. at 502–09.  California was not alone among states in moving from punitive but 
fiscally expensive penal policies to softer but more affordable options.  See German Lopez,
Mass Incarceration in America, Explained in 22 Maps and Charts, VOX (Oct. 22, 2016, 
1:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/7/13/8913297/mass-incarceration-maps-charts [https:// 
perma.cc/LFL9-8M9H].  Reforms like AB 109 and Proposition 47 played a role in reducing 
prison populations and costs but attracted powerful criticism from district attorneys.  See, 
e.g., Michele Hanisee, The Lies Behind the Selling of Prop 47 & 57, ASS’N DEPUTY 
DISTRICT ATT’YS, https://laadda.com/lies-behind-selling-prop-47-57/ [https://perma.cc/ 4JPF- 
HRAF]. Cara Bayles provides a useful overview of how public sentiment has shifted over 
time on “tough on crime.”  See Cara Bayles, Calif. Move from ‘Tough on Crime’ Marks 
New Era of Reform, LAW360 (Dec. 16, 2018, 8:02 PM), https://law360.com/articles/1109195/ 
calif-move-from-tough-on-crime-marks-new-era-of-reform [https://perma.cc/ATY6-9LFZ]. 
Professor Mary Fan suggests that these shifts have provided political cover for reform and
offer the potential for a transition from short-term emergency response to longer-term penal 
reform.  Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90
N.C. L. REV. 581, 647 (2012). 
413. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 1; see also MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S 
OFFICE, COMMON CLAIMS ABOUT PROPOSITION 13, at 1–2 (2016). 
414. See John Myers, Proposition 13 Treats All California Property Taxes the Same. 
Voters Could Change That in 2020, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.
latimes.com/california/story/2019-08-14/california-proposition-13-business-taxes-split-
roll [https://perma.cc/ZV7P-RW5X]. (“Though Proposition 13 generally remains popular— 
65% of likely voters in a PPIC survey last year said the law has been mostly a good thing 
for the state—polls have also suggested voters are willing to rethink the tax rules for 
businesses.”). 
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its effect has been to reduce the tax base of counties and make financing 
of new infrastructure projects more difficult.415 
Counties were faced with a rising jail population but a reduced tax base 
to finance the construction of new jails. Overcrowded jails led to disorder 
and illness, both physical and mental.416  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Brown resulted in the passing of AB 109, which again threatened to
increase jail populations as certain felonies were reclassified and sentences 
were served in jails rather than prisons.417  A by-product of this has been
an increase in state court tort claims by individual prisoners and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 class actions.418  Defending these actions is expensive and can become 
a heavy burden for counties with low populations.419  The consequences
of punitive damages in individual prisoner tort actions or huge class action 
damages or decrees can be severe, and the costs are not negligible even for 
the most populous counties.420 
415. See TAYLOR, supra note 413, at 22–23, 40. 
416. For a more expansive look at how overcrowding, inter alia, can lead to physical 
illnesses in prisons, see WORLD HEALTH ORG., PRISONS AND HEALTH (Stefan Enggist et al. 
eds., 2014), https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/249188/Prisons-and-
Health.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/8PFE-KK6P]. 
417. Joan Petersilia, California Prison Downsizing and Its Impact on Local Criminal 
Justice Systems, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 327, 327, 332 (2014). 
418. See Christopher Petrella & Alex Friedmann, Consequences of California’s 
Realignment Initiative, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (June 12, 2014), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/ 
news/2014/jun/12/consequences-californias-realignment-initiative/ [https://perma.cc/5PEB- 
QR45].
419. See supra notes 274–77 and accompanying text. 
420. Consequences of class action awards and decrees may be economic, social, or
reputational.  Professor Margo Schlanger discusses some of these in the context of Brown 
in a wide-ranging article.  See generally Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: 
Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165 (2013).  She observes 
that the Court could have ordered the release of tens of thousands of sentenced prisoners—
a potentially serious social consequence—or required California to expend billions of 
dollars in new prison construction—a serious economic consequence.  Id. at 165. Actual 
costs and expenses of such actions are incalculable.  See Jonathan Simon, ‘Mass Incarceration 
Now, Tomorrow, Forever’: Gov. Jerry Brown and the Politics of Court Bashing, U.C. 
BERKELEY: BERKELEY BLOG (Apr. 16, 2013), https://blogs.berkeley.edu/2013/04/16/mass-
incarceration-now-tomorrow-forever-gov-jerry-brown-and-the-politicis-of-court-bashing/ 
[https://perma.cc/S5JX-JH4J] (“In the long run, an effective alternative to mass incarceration is
not going to mean big short term cost savings for the State (or perhaps any at all).”). Brown
resulted in an overall reduction of California’s prison population—a saving to the State—
but an increase in costs in upgrading security, training officers, and enlarging and updating
facilities in failure—a cost to counties. See id.; Tamara Tabo, The Consequences of Brown
v. Plata Are Nothing to Dismiss: The California Prison Case Continues, ABOVE THE LAW 
(Oct. 17, 2013, 11:41 AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2013/10/the-consequences-of-brown-v-
plata-are-nothing-to-dismiss-the-california-prison-case-continues/ [https://perma.cc/A6JE- 
AD2K]. If district attorneys are to be believed, there were other costs too—increased 
property crime and drug use—a societal cost.  See Hanisee, supra note 412.  Reputational 
damage from assaults or neglect by staff in jails is difficult to quantify but widespread
664
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The result has been an almost universal effort by counties to extract the 
maximum possible from staff and facilities at the lowest cost.  The effects 
of this are reflected in overcrowded and understaffed prisons, dilapidated 
buildings, cuts in educational and vocational programs, and health care of
inmates. Prisoners have few advocates and attract little public sympathy. 
However, in a humane society governed by the rule of law, prisoners should 
not lose all their rights and dignity when they lose their liberty.  In this 
Article we have tried to evaluate the effectiveness of one possible way in 
which minimal prison standards might be maintained—the statutory duty 
of California’s grand juries to inquire into the public prisons and seek 
answers. 421
On the face of it, grand juries are well equipped for the task.  They have
a free roving commission, the right to inspect documents and premises, to 
issue subpoenas, to instruct experts, and hire advisors.422  They report to the 
superior court and their reports are made public.423  They can require responses
from persons and bodies.424  Their deliberations are held in secret and it is 
a criminal offense for jurors to disclose the subject of their investigation.425 
The legal status of a CGJ and its ability to compel secrecy on the part of 
witnesses whom it questions is unclear.  There is authority to the effect that a
grand jury is a judicial body and part of the local county superior court.426 
That being the case, the question arises as to whether it can impose conditions 
of confidentiality on those whom it questions.  Absent express statutory
authority to that effect, we suggest that duty might only arise in circumstances 
where the CGJ makes known to a witness before examination starts that 
the CGJ considers the entirety of what is to follow to be subject to conditions
of confidence and that the witness is not at liberty to disclose evidence or
media coverage and substantial damages awards are a certain result. See discussion supra
Section III.B (describing the consequences of the beating death of Martin Harrison
resulting in an $8.3 million settlement).
421. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 919(b) (West 2008). 
422. Id. §§ 921, 926(a)–(b); see also People v. Sperl, 54 Cal. App. 3d 640, 653–54
(1976) (“Furthermore, where public records are the object of a subpoena, a person having 
custody of same cannot refuse to produce them . . . .”). 
423. CAL. PENAL CODE § 933(a) (West 2008). 
424. Id. § 933(c). 
425.  Id. §§ 924.1, 924.2. 
426. See People v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara Cty., 531 P.2d 761, 766 (Cal. 
1975) (“As [Penal Code § 888] indicates, and as the California precedents have long
recognized, the grand jury is a ‘judicial body,’ ‘an instrumentality of the courts of this 
state . . . .’”  (first quoting Ex parte Sternes, 23 P. 38, 39 (Cal. 1889); then quoting Ex parte 
Shuler, 292 P. 481, 493 (Cal. 1930))). 
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facts disclosed without leave of the CGJ.  A witness could expressly
decline to accept the condition of confidentiality and it would then be up 
to the CGJ to decide whether to proceed with questioning.  We suggest
that a witness who does not explicitly consent to testify under conditions
of confidence may be free to disclose evidence to others without penalty. 
However, we further suggest that a witness who agrees to testify under 
conditions of confidence may be cited for contempt of court if they disclose
their testimony or the nature of the CGJ’s inquiries.427  These speculations
are not merely academic.  Such circumstances did arise in one county where 
a CGJ attempted to impose on a potential witness conditions of confidentiality 
under threat of a citation for contempt.428  All these are potentially formidable
tools for investigating wrongdoing and neglect.  All county grand juries have 
a website on which their reports are made public and their findings are regularly 
disseminated through press and other media reports.429 
Rather than simply analyze and describe the findings and recommendations
of grand juries, we chose to evaluate their effectiveness as a watchdog by 
looking to see whether grand juries foresaw and warned against circumstances 
that ultimately gave rise to civil rights litigation within their counties.  We 
also used this focus to see whether, once an action had been brought
successfully, subsequent grand juries showed that the county had learned 
lessons from its past conduct. 
Our findings in the preceding section show a mixed picture. Some grand
juries were assiduous in going about their task and were stern critics of
427. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968) (“Indeed, the role of criminal 
contempt and that of many ordinary criminal laws seem identical—protection of the institutions 
of our government and enforcement of their mandates.”). 
428. See CTY. OF RIVERSIDE GRAND JURY, 2012–2013 GRAND JURY REPORT: CITY OF 
RIVERSIDE, OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY 1–2 (2013), https://countyofriverside.us/Portals/
0/GrandJury/Report_Riverside_Office_of_the_City_Attorney_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HK4S-M3RR] [hereinafter RIVERSIDE, 2012–2013 REPORT].  Here, the CGJ subpoenaed
the Riverside city attorney and asked him to sign a confidentiality agreement. Id. at 1. 
The city attorney declined to sign and the CGJ proceeded to question him under oath. Id.
At the end of his testimony, the CGJ admonished him in the following words: “You are
ordered not to discuss or disclose the questions asked of you and your answers, or any
information learned from the grand jury.  A violation of these instructions on your part 
may be the basis for a charge against you of contempt of court.”  Id. at 2.  The city attorney 
subsequently filed a motion with the superior court to discharge subpoenas issued by the
CGJ against city commissioners in the course of which the nature of the CGJ’s 
investigation was disclosed. Id. at 2–3. The CGJ did not cite the city attorney for contempt, so
the question of whether he could have been successfully held in contempt remains
unresolved.  In its report, the CGJ recommended that “[t]he City of Riverside, Office of 
the City Attorney, shall refresh their memory on the responsibilities of the Grand Jury and
shall honor the secrecy of the Grand Jury.” Id. at 4. 
429. See, e.g., Grand Jury, COUNTY RIVERSIDE CAL., https://countyofriverside.us/Home/
GrandJury.aspx#gsc.tab=0 [https://perma.cc/NS3P-AHMN].
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sheriffs and county boards of supervisors.430  Others seemed to be, at best, 
asleep at the helm—and, at worst, naïve cheerleaders for failing facilities.431 
We offer the following observations as explanation for some of these
behaviors.  First and foremost, a civil grand jury is a collection of predominantly
amateur investigators.432  Initially it is self-selecting because its members
are usually volunteers who have responded to the county’s invitation to 
apply for service.433  Members may have a range of reasons for doing so.434 
Its numbers are small—a maximum of twenty-three jurors.435  The process 
by which jurors are selected is not uniform.436  Most counties have a grand
jury web page, which usually explains how members of the public can 
apply to become civil grand jurors and describes how selection is made.437 
430. See, e.g., supra notes 171–80 and accompanying text (detailing the Butte County
Grand Jury’s diligent review of county jail facilities). 
431. See, e.g., supra notes 302–19 and accompanying text (describing the San 
Bernardino County Grand Jury’s general acceptance of county jail facility conditions 
despite multiple lawsuits complaining of the conditions). 
432. See generally CAL. GRAND JURORS’ ASS’N, THE CALIFORNIA GRAND JURY SYSTEM 
23–27 (3d ed. 2014), https://cgja.org/sites/default/files/the_california_grand_jury_system
edition3_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP74-R2RP].  The “amateur” nature of the jury is an aspect
of its requirement to be representative of its county and the wide autonomy it enjoys in 
choosing the matters it will investigate.  See id. at 25.  The qualifications are minimal: a juror 
must be “[a] citizen of the United States 18 years or older; a resident of the county for one 
year immediately prior to being selected; in possession of their natural faculties; of ordinary 
intelligence, sound judgment, and fair character; and possessed of sufficient knowledge of 
the English language.”  Id.  Members receive a basic training to assist them in performing 
their duties.  Id. at 27.  Members of a CGJ are also “amateurs” in the sense that they are 
not salaried but receive only their expenses and a fixed daily stipend.  See, e.g., Commitment/ 
Compensation, supra note 50. 
433. See CAL. GRAND JURORS’ ASS’N, supra note 432, at 25–26. But see id. at 26 
(noting that some counties “have such significant difficulty that they resort to random 
selection from the trial jury pool”). 
434. See, e.g., John Phillips & Janet Clark, Opinion: Why You Should Join the County 
Civil Grand Jury, MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 20, 2018, 6:45 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/ 
2018/02/20/opinion-why-you-should-join-the-county-civil-grand-jury/ [https://perma.cc/
X7HR-ATBA]; see also Aidan Freeman, Supervisor Brown: 2017–2018 Civil Grand Jury 
Report is ‘Nonsense’, RECORD-BEE (Oct. 2, 2018, 5:10 PM), https://www.record-
bee.com/2018/10/02/supervisor-brown-2017-2018-civil-grand-jury-report-is-nonsense/
[https://perma.cc/TG72-XUTM] (“[A] grand juror who worked on the most recent report, 
told the board that ‘When I entered the grand jury last year, I was very sensitive to the fact 
that it might be a place for people to complain, bring up their own problems, and do witch 
hunts.  It turned out not to be true.’”). 
435. CAL. PENAL CODE § 888.2(a) (West 2008). 
436. See CAL. GRAND JURORS’ ASS’N, supra note 432, at 25. 
437. See, e.g., Grand Jury Participation, ORANGE COUNTY, https://media.ocgov.com/
residents/gov/grandjury.asp [https://perma.cc/3639-MVLC]. An inspection showed that 
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Whatever the manner of shortlisting, a panel of prospective jurors is 
drawn up from which the eventual required number are drawn at random.
Certain factors militate against an optimal selection of the persons best
qualified to perform the tasks required of the jury—a volunteer pool of
applicants, shortlisting by judges or court officials with their own views 
as to who is best fitted to the task, and final selection by chance.438 
We assume that the supervising superior court judge attempts to assemble
a panel from those willing to serve with a range of knowledge, skills, and 
experience appropriate to the tasks in hand.  Even then, the eventual grand
jury chosen by lot does not necessarily include the brightest and the best
from the panel. The jury’s duties and powers are wideranging.  Even the 
most cursory glance through the reports of the fifty-eight counties’ grand
juries reveals an extraordinary range of matters investigated by them.  These
range from such things as antimalarial insect patrols,439 corrupt officials,440 
all fifteen of the counties selected for study in this Article maintained a grand jury website. 
See, e.g., id. The ten largest and medium population counties’ websites either provided an 
online application for interested citizens to apply to join the grand jury or a phone number
to call to have a form sent to the inquirer.  See, e.g., id.  Of the five lowest population
counties, only Mendocino and Plumas counties provided online application forms or a
contact number to obtain one. See Grand Jury, COUNTY MENDOCINO CAL., https://
www.mendocinocounty.org/government/grand-jury [https://perma.cc/CZX9-CYMT];
Grand Jury, PLUMAS COUNTY CAL., https://www.plumascounty.us/216/Grand-Jury [https://
perma.cc/7JMB-9BSP].  Calaveras and Glenn counties provided no online information
about joining the CGJ nor did they provide information about the selection process.  See 
Grand Jury, CALAVERAS COUNTY, https://grandjury.calaverasgov.us/#gsc.tab=0 [https:// 
perma.cc/WX7J-YWD4]; Grand Jury, COUNTY GLENN CAL., https://www.countyofglenn. 
net/dept/grand-jury/welcome [https://perma.cc/6U8P-UT33].  However, a press report suggests
that Glenn County sought citizen volunteers to serve on its grand jury.  See County Seeks
Citizens to Serve on Grand Jury, GLENN COUNTY TRANSCRIPT (Apr. 9, 2019), https://
appeal-democrat.com/glenn_county_transcript/county-seeks-citizens-to-serve-on-grand-
jury/article_e227deca-5b1f-11e9-b3ce-27c04ac425f9.html [https://perma.cc/R5BQ-K3Y7].
438.  An optimal selection might only be achieved if the tasks a CGJ was to perform 
were known with certainty in advance.  Although the CGJ reports to the presiding judge 
of the county’s superior court, the judge cannot control the scope of each year’s inquiries 
because determining these lies within each CGJ’s discretion. 
439. See, e.g., CTY. OF ORANGE CAL. GRAND JURY 2016–2017, IS ORANGE COUNTY 
READY FOR ZIKA? IT TAKES A VILLAGE TO HANDLE MOSQUITO-BORNE VIRUSES (2017), 
http://www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/2016_2017_GJreport/2017-04-18_Website_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SNK9-8UDG]; MONTEREY CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, 2013–2014 FINAL 
REPORT 53–59 (2014), https://media.graphcms.com/a3Ke80hgTRKTUPDG7mQH [https://
perma.cc/7TMA-K8ZS] (containing a sub-report titled Mosquito Abatement in Monterey
County).
440. See, e.g., District Attorney Should Be Fired, Civil Grand Jury Says, CAPRADIO
(May 12, 2017), https://www.capradio.org/articles/2017/05/12/district-attorney-should-be-
fired-civil-grand-jury-says/ [https://perma.cc/Z29U-7SUY].
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poor value civic contracts,441 environmental concerns,442 building code 
enforcement,443 public school districts,444 city governance,445 to earthquake 
preparedness.446  Inquiries into the public prisons in the county may be a
duty but is only one of many competing interests that grand jurors may 
wish to pursue in greater or lesser depth.
Another problem is that jurors usually serve for a single year and must 
complete all their inquiries within their year.447  They cannot bind their
successors but often do leave advice, which is usually followed, that the 
following year’s jurors examine requested responses and comment on 
their adequacy.448  A grand jury can only act on evidence put before it—a
consequence of this is that a jury cannot take up where an unfinished 
441. See, e.g., ALAMEDA, 2015–2016 REPORT, supra note 117, at 31–42 (investigating
high garbage and composting collection rates resulting from award of city’s new Zero 
Waste franchise contracts); SAN BERNARDINO, 2014–2015 REPORT, supra note 283, at 5–9 
(investigating causes of an approximately $750,000 cost overrun on a sewer laying 
contract). 
442. See, e.g., MONTEREY CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, 2015–2016 FINAL REPORT 163– 
210 (2016), https://media.graphcms.com/jjWqiGT7yP8oPCAsDgEg [https://perma.cc/
VEP3-N32M].
443. See, e.g., CITY & CTY. OF S.F. CIVIL GRAND JURY 2012–2013, BUILDING A
BETTER FUTURE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING INSPECTION 15–23 (2013), https:// 
civilgrandjury.sfgov.org/2012_2013/BuildingABetterFuture.pdf [https://perma.cc/QB8S-
JJ3H].
444. See, e.g., 2017–2018 ALAMEDA CTY. GRAND JURY, FINAL REPORT 25–39 (2018),
http://grandjury.acgov.org/grandjury-assets/docs/2017-2018/GJ-FinalReport-2017-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4GSD-PGS9]; 2009–2010 SANTA CLARA CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, 
ACHIEVING SCHOOL DISTRICT EFFICIENCY THROUGH CONSOLIDATION (2010), http://www.
scscourt.org/court_divisions/civil/cgj/2010/SchoolDistrictConsolidation.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S383-3KU9].
445. See, e.g., 2018–2019 CIVIL GRAND JURY, RIVERSIDE CTY., CITY OF BANNING 
COUNCIL AND CITY MANAGER RELATIONSHIP (2019), https://countyofriverside.us/Portals/ 
0/GrandJury/GrandJury2018-2019/Banning_Report.pdf?ver=2019-06-20-111929-933 
[https://perma.cc/T37J-6BQM].
446. See, e.g., 2010–2011 MARIN CTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, DISASTER PREPAREDNESS 
IN MARIN: ARE YOU READY? (2011), https://www.marincounty.org/-/media/files/departments/
gj/reports-responses/2010/disaster-preparedness-in-marin.pdf [https://perma.cc/K25Q-PMJP];
CITY AND CTY. OF S.F. 2012–2013 CIVIL GRAND JURY, ACT NOW BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE:
AGGRESSIVELY EXPAND AND ENHANCE OUR HIGH-PRESSURE EMERGENCY FIREFIGHTING 
WATER SYSTEM SFCGJ 2018–2019: EXPAND AND ENHANCE OUR EMERGENCY FIREFIGHTING 
WATER SYSTEM (2019), https://civilgrandjury.sfgov.org/2018_2019/AWSS_Final_Report_
with_Appendices_6_13_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NMJ-SCDY].
447. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 901(a) (West 2008). 
448. See id. § 924.4. 
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investigation of the previous year left off.449  This necessarily makes
examinations in great depth difficult and running inquiries impossible. 
Their greatest weakness is that they can only warn and advise—rather
like the constitutional position of a modern British monarch. In our perusal
of reports, we came across a few testy spats where public or elected officials
clearly resented what they saw as the interference of the grand jury 
in affairs that, in their view, were being run satisfactorily.450  This reached
something of a climax when one Riverside County grand jury issued subpoenas 
against a city attorney and city commissioners.451  Prior to taking the city 
attorney’s evidence under subpoena, the CGJ attempted to get the city attorney 
and his attorney to sign confidentiality agreements.452  Both refused to sign 
statements acknowledging a secrecy order.453  After testifying, both were
admonished to preserve secrecy under threat of citation for contempt of 
court.454  The city attorney subsequently applied to the court to discharge 
CGJ subpoenas against the city commissioners.455  The CGJ responded by
making a formal recommendation in its report that, inter alia, the “Office 
of the City Attorney[] shall refresh their memory on the responsibilities 
of the Grand Jury and shall honor the secrecy of the Grand Jury.”456 The
reluctance of public officials and elected representatives to acknowledge 
any fault in their actions is legendary and their occasional insolence and 
condescension is predictable when faced with criticism by what they perceive 
as interfering amateurs. 
As we have shown above, some grand juries paid close attention to the 
public prisons among their many other duties and interests.457  By far the
most common complaint was that prisons and jails were dilapidated,458 
449. See id. §§ 924, 924.1(a), 924.4. 
450. See, e.g., Janice Bitters, Santa Clara Not Complying with Records Law, Civil 
Grand Jury Report, SAN JOSE SPOTLIGHT (June 19, 2019), https://sanjosespotlight.com/santa-
clara-not-complying-with-records-law-civil-grand-jury-report-says/ [https://perma.cc/D7FU-
G95A]. 
451. See RIVERSIDE, 2012–2013 REPORT, supra note 428, at 1.
452.  Id. 
453. Id. 
454. Id. at 2. 
455. Id. 
456. Id. at 4.  For the response of the city attorney, see Gregory P. Priamos, City of 
Riverside’s Response to the 2012–2013 Grand Jury Report: City of Riverside, Office of
the City Attorney (July 10, 2013), https://countyofriverside.us/Portals/0/GrandJury/Responses
2012-2013/Response%20from%20City%20of%20Riverside%20Office%20of%20the% 
20City%20Attorney%20-%20City%20of%20Riverside%20Office%20of%20the%20City%
20Attorney%20Rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/YF8U-P9Y4].
457. See, e.g., supra notes 292–94, 323–61 and accompanying text. 
458. See supra notes 161, 173–76, 278, 382, 399 and accompanying text. 
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overcrowded,459 and understaffed.460  Such criticisms were unlikely to draw
the ire of wardens and sheriffs as they did not control the intake or have 
the capital budgets to make good the deficiencies identified.  Indeed, they
may have viewed the jurors’ observations as helpful in their own campaigns 
for new or better facilities.  Many deficiencies may not have been obvious 
to jurors in the relatively short visits they paid individual institutions but 
were “helpfully” pointed out to them by wardens, jailers, and sheriffs.  To 
that extent, the grand juries play a useful role in mediating between those 
running jails and the boards of supervisors.  If they are sufficiently consistent 
in their criticisms from one year to the next, they have a useful “bully pulpit” 
function. They have one final advantage in that they bring an outsider’s 
eye to affairs and may have insights that are not obvious to those most closely 
involved from day to day. 
The most striking observation we made is the lack of clearly stated awareness 
of ongoing or recently concluded class or tortious claims brought against
sheriff’s departments and counties. Apart from a handful of references in
the 150 final reports we read, we found little explicit evidence that grand
juries were aware of these claims involving the very institutions they were 
inspecting.  In some cases, we could infer awareness but, for the greater part, 
juries seemed to act in ignorance of significant claims associated with the 
running or management of the facilities inspected.  This is unfortunate as 
attention to these could have shaped their inquiries usefully.  The terms of 
the superior court’s charge to a grand jury are not made public and so we
have no means of telling whether superior court judges are drawing incoming
civil grand juries’ attention to past or pending civil rights suits regarding 
prison conditions brought against counties or sheriffs.  If they are doing
so, then evidence suggests that many CGJs seem to ignore these in shaping
their inquiries.  If superior court judges are not drawing CGJs’ attention to 
these suits, then it would seem prudent that they should do so. 
We would also draw attention to the Institute for Court Management’s 
informative 2002 report on the fitness of grand juries to conduct civil
investigations.461  The report notes: “The skills grand jurors bring to their
position must be considered in addressing training needs.  Investigations
requiring interviewing techniques, fact-finding and analysis skills are critical 
459. See supra notes 105, 173, 328–53, 380, 387, 395–401 and accompanying text. 
460. See supra notes 21, 177, 230, 277, 309, 380–86 and accompanying text. 
461. See FOWLER-BRADLEY, supra note 38, at iv–vi. 
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for every member of the grand jury to perform effectively.”462  However, 
the report goes on to say that a poll of California county counsel as to the 
sufficiency of jurors’ skills revealed: “Of those county counsels responding, 
56% felt grand jurors possessed the interviewing and report writing skills 
necessary to carry out their duties, while 35% indicated they did not.  The 
remaining 9% had no opinion or said the skills vary.”463  Such a verdict by
legal professionals with close knowledge of CGJs is not an entirely ringing 
endorsement of their fitness for the task. 
V. CONCLUSION
We are impressed with the work done by many civil grand juries in 
ensuring that the public prisons in their counties are run in a humane way
and minimizing the prospects of civil rights claims being brought against
their counties.  However, we conclude that whatever their strengths, their 
remit and duties are ill-defined and do not afford a reliable means in every
county of detecting likely failings in the prison system.  The range of 
available skills, experience, and knowledge in a low population county is 
rarely likely to lead to the kind of searching inquiry needed to identify all 
the problems that might lead to civil rights litigation.  Such litigation presents 
a major threat to low population counties, which can ill afford to defend, 
and perhaps settle, such claims.
We also feel that there is a methodological problem in how grand juries 
go about the task of inspecting the public prisons. Some have explicitly
adopted the advice and model checklists of statewide organizations.  Others 
have adopted their own methods and approached the task in a seemingly
casual and unsystematic way.  These differing approaches do not lend public 
confidence to consistently accurate findings. A very real problem is that
while such checklists state items to be checked, they do not specify standards
to be applied that would be familiar to corrections professionals.  Whether 
an item is “satisfactory” is often left to the subjective judgement of the subset
of jurors conducting an inspection. 
There is significant variation in the ways CGJs fulfill their statutory 
responsibilities and the frequency of their inspections.  Some CGJs showed
insight into the potential threat to prisoner welfare and their county’s finances
posed by staff training and conduct, physical conditions, and programs 
offered to inmates. Others showed little awareness of these factors. 
We conclude that grand jury investigations are a useful complement and 
democratic addition to a statewide inspection regime but not an answer in 
themselves to the problems facing the prison system.  In a future paper we
462. Id. at 46–47. 
463. Id. at 47. 
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will seek to evaluate the effectiveness of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, internal 
grievance procedures, and the Office of the Ombudsman to detect and
correct shortcomings. 
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